Supership Scan MCP Server
supership-scan
npm
v2.0.2
Published by andysalvo — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
supership indexes the entire x402 economy (52,000 services) so an AI agent can find and buy the right data across Base, Solana, and Polygon -- ranked by real usage, with a signed delivery receipt. No wallet needed on the seller's chain.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/rules/injection.mjs)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/rules/injection.mjs:50`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: isk', fix: 'Replace eval() with safer alternatives: JSON.parse for data, or restructure the logic to avoid dynamic e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/rules/injection.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/rules/injection.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/rules/injection.mjs:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ument arrays instead of exec() with interpolated strings. Validate and sanitize all inputs.', }, { id: 'INJ-008'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/rules/injection.mjs
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "procure"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "procure" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool procure · inputSchema.properties.url
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (benchmark/run.mjs)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (a Supabase service_role key (full-access credential)) appears in `benchmark/run.mjs:65`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server benchmark/run.mjs
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmark/run.mjs)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmark/run.mjs:24`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: req, res) => {", " eval(req.body.code);", "});", "const { exec } = require('child_process');", "exec(`l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmark/run.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmark/run.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmark/run.mjs:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst { exec } = require('child_process');", "exec(`ls ${req.query.dir}`);", ].join('\n'), 'auth.js': [ "cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmark/run.mjs
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
procureingests untrusted inputlist_catalogno sensitive capabilitymanifestno sensitive capabilityscan_directoryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.2 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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