System Monitoring MCP Server
@supernova123/system-monitoring-mcp-server
npm
v0.1.11
Published by @supernova123 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Linux system monitoring — CPU, memory, disk, network, processes, systemd services, and system logs for Claude, Cursor, and AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 15.4 = 85. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×10 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 85 − 11 = 74. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 20
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/disk-usage.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/disk-usage.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import("child_process"); const cmd = targetPath ? `df -B1 "${targetPath}" 2>
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/disk-usage.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/login-history.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/login-history.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function registerLoginHistoryTools(server) { server.tool("login_histo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/login-history.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/memory-detail.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/memory-detail.js:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import("child_process"); const safeLimit = Math.min(Math.max(limit || 15, 1), 50);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/memory-detail.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/network-interfaces.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/network-interfaces.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import("child_process"); const output = execSync("ip -j addr 2>/dev/null || ip -json addr 2>
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/network-interfaces.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/network-speed.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/network-speed.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function registerNetworkSpeedTools(server) { server.tool("network_dia
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/network-speed.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/process-list.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/process-list.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import("child_process"); const sortFlag = sort_by === "memory" ? "--sort=-%mem" : "--sort=-%
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/process-list.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/process-tree.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/process-tree.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import("child_process"); const depth = Math.min(Math.max(max_depth || 3, 1), 10);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/process-tree.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/system-info.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/system-info.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; function readFile(path) { try { return fs.readFileSync(path, "utf-8"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/system-info.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/system-logs.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/system-logs.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import("child_process"); const parts = ["journalctl", "--no-pager", "-o", "short-iso"];
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/system-logs.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/system-overview.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/system-overview.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import("child_process"); const dfOutput = execSync("df -B1 / 2>/dev/null | tail -1", { encod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/system-overview.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/memory-detail.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/memory-detail.js:66`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`ps aux --sort=-%mem --no-headers | head -${safeLimit}`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/memory-detail.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/network-interfaces.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/network-interfaces.js:71`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`ss ${ssFlags} 2>/dev/null | tail -n +2`, { encoding: "utf-8",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/network-interfaces.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/network-speed.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/network-speed.js:26`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const dnsResult = execSync(`timeout ${timeout} nslookup ${dnsHost} 2>&1 | head -10`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/network-speed.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/process-list.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/process-list.js:11`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`ps aux ${sortFlag} --no-headers | head -${safeLimit}`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 5
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/process-list.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/process-tree.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/process-tree.js:14`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`pstree ${show_pids ? "-a" : ""} ${pidFlag} 2>/dev/null | head -${Math.pow(2, depth) *
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/process-tree.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/systemd-services.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/systemd-services.js:9`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`systemctl list-units --type=service --no-pager --no-legend ${filterFlag} 2>/dev/null`,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/systemd-services.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/tools/memory-detail.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/memory-detail.ts:80`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync( `ps aux --sort=-%mem --no-headers | head -${safeLimit}`, { encodin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/memory-detail.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/tools/network-interfaces.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/network-interfaces.ts:86`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`ss ${ssFlags} 2>/dev/null | tail -n +2`, { encoding: "utf-8", time
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/network-interfaces.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/tools/network-speed.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/network-speed.ts:34`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const dnsResult = execSync( `timeout ${timeout} nslookup ${dnsHost} 2>&1 | head -10`, { encodi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/network-speed.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/tools/process-list.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/process-list.ts:17`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync( `ps aux ${sortFlag} --no-headers | head -${safeLimit}`, { encoding
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/process-list.ts
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
network_diagnosticsingests untrusted inputcpu_infono sensitive capabilitydisk_usageno sensitive capabilityinode_usageno sensitive capabilityio_statsno sensitive capabilitylogin_historyno sensitive capabilitymemory_detailno sensitive capabilitynetwork_connectionsno sensitive capabilitynetwork_interfacesno sensitive capabilityopen_filesno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
process_listno sensitive capabilityprocess_treeno sensitive capabilityservice_statusno sensitive capabilitysystem_infono sensitive capabilitysystem_logsno sensitive capabilitysystem_overviewno sensitive capabilitysystemd_servicesno sensitive capabilitytemperature_sensorsno sensitive capabilitytop_memory_consumersno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.11 latest |
C 74/100 | 20 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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