Superbased MCP Server
superbased
npm
v2.0.9
Published by marmutapp — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 15.4 = 85. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×10 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 85 − 11 = 74. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 30
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/electron/core/input-injection/windows.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/core/input-injection/windows.js:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/core/input-injection/windows.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/electron/main.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/main.js:1971`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/main.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/electron/modules/context-menu-detect.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/context-menu-detect.js:59`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/context-menu-detect.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/electron/modules/platform/dpi.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/platform/dpi.js:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/platform/dpi.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/ax.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/ax.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/ax.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/capture.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/capture.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/capture.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/launch.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/launch.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/launch.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/window.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/window.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/platform/macos/window.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/electron/modules/platform/shared.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/platform/shared.js:110`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/platform/shared.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/electron/modules/platform/windows/ax.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/platform/windows/ax.js:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/platform/windows/ax.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/electron/modules/dictation.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/dictation.js:172`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fetch('https://api.superbased.app/api/v1/ai/dictation-stt-config'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/dictation.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/headless/electron/modules/dictation.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/headless/electron/modules/dictation.js:172`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fetch('https://api.superbased.app/api/v1/ai/dictation-stt-config'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/headless/electron/modules/dictation.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/headless/headless/dictation-hotkey.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/headless/headless/dictation-hotkey.js:172`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fetch('https://api.superbased.app/api/v1/ai/dictation-stt-config'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/headless/headless/dictation-hotkey.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/electron/db/database.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/db/database.js:208`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(`ALTER TABLE captures ADD COLUMN ${col.name} ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/db/database.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/electron/main.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/main.js:1973`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`osascript -e 'set the clipboard to POSIX file "${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/main.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/electron/modules/context-menu-detect.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/context-menu-detect.js:102`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/context-menu-detect.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/electron/modules/platform/shared.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/platform/shared.js:128`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/platform/shared.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/electron/modules/platform/windows/session.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/platform/windows/session.js:49`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -Command "@(Get-Process -Name '${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/platform/windows/session.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/electron/modules/platform/windows/window.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/platform/windows/window.js:210`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${script}" -Hwnd ${nativeId} -State ${state} -BX ${bx} -BY ${by} -BW ${bw} -BH ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/platform/windows/window.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/electron/modules/window-activate.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/window-activate.js:209`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${script}" -TargetHwnd ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/window-activate.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/electron/modules/window-input.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/window-input.js:121`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${script}" -Hwnd ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/window-input.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/headless/electron/db/database.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/headless/electron/db/database.js:208`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(`ALTER TABLE captures ADD COLUMN ${col.name} ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/headless/electron/db/database.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/headless/electron/modules/context-menu-detect.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/headless/electron/modules/context-menu-detect.js:102`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/headless/electron/modules/context-menu-detect.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/electron/core/config.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/core/config.js:58`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require(p)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/core/config.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/electron/modules/api-server.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/electron/modules/api-server.js:2628`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require(p)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/electron/modules/api-server.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/headless/electron/core/config.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/headless/electron/core/config.js:58`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require(p)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/headless/electron/core/config.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/headless/electron/modules/api-server.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/headless/electron/modules/api-server.js:2628`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require(p)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/headless/electron/modules/api-server.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/headless/headless/cli.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/headless/headless/cli.js:157`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require(mcpPath)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/headless/headless/cli.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/headless/headless/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/headless/headless/doctor.js:175`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require(name)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/headless/headless/doctor.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/headless/headless/tui-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/headless/headless/tui-bridge.js:75`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require(s)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/headless/headless/tui-bridge.js
Tools 72
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
superbased_galleryingests untrusted inputsuperbased_ui_dumpreads sensitive datasuperbased_accessibility_treeno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_aino sensitive capabilitysuperbased_ai_usageno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_annotateno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_authno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_ax_invokeno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_baselineno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_captureno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_capture_imageno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_capture_templateno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_clickno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_clipboardno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_compress_textno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_context_menu_selectno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_describe_framesno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_dialog_handleno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_dictateno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_dictation_historyno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_diffno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_display_listno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_doctor_gui_automationno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_dragno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_drag_fileno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_dry_runno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_exportno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_find_imageno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_find_in_pageno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_find_title_bar_drag_regionno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_focus_windowno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_form_fillno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_gallery_imageno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_gallery_updateno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_healthno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_hotkeyno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_hoverno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_launch_appno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_licenseno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_locateno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_mouse_positionno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_narrateno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_ocrno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_open_urlno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_pixel_colorno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_presetsno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_projectno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_recordingno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_redactno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_replayno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_resize_windowno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_screenshotno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_scrollno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_scroll_captureno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_scroll_tono sensitive capabilitysuperbased_sequenceno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_sessionsno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_settingsno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_stt_statusno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_tab_managementno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_toolsno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_transcribeno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_tray_clickno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_typeno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_undo_lastno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_virtual_desktopno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_waitno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_wait_forno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_window_boundsno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_window_listno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_window_stateno sensitive capabilitysuperbased_workspace_syncno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (72 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.9 latest |
C 74/100 | 30 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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