Supabase Coolify MCP Server
supabase-coolify-mcp-server
npm
v1.2.4
Published by dj-pearson — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for managing self-hosted Supabase on Coolify with full deployment support
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([deploy_migration, execute_sql, rollback_migration, create_migration_with_rollback, get_edge_function_logs]) and tools that can send data out ([supabase_cli_execute]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [deploy_migration, execute_sql, rollback_migration, create_migration_with_rollback, get_edge_function_logs] → sinks [supabase_cli_execute]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow deploy_migration → supabase_cli_execute
high Tool "supabase_cli_execute" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "supabase_cli_execute" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool supabase_cli_execute
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/supabase-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/supabase-cli.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { exec } from 'child_process'; const ex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/supabase-cli.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (diagnose.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`diagnose.ts:543`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nnectivity await axios.get('https://www.google.com', { timeout: 5000 }); this.addResult({
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server diagnose.ts
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "supabase_cli_execute"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "supabase_cli_execute" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool supabase_cli_execute · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "supabase_cli_execute" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "supabase_cli_execute" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool supabase_cli_execute
Tools 53
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_migration_with_rollbackreads sensitive datadeploy_migrationreads sensitive dataexecute_sqlreads sensitive dataget_edge_function_logsreads sensitive datarollback_migrationreads sensitive datasupabase_cli_executeruns code / shellcheck_cli_installedno sensitive capabilitycheck_supabase_healthno sensitive capabilitycreate_storage_bucketno sensitive capabilitydelete_edge_functionno sensitive capability
Show 43 more tools ↓
delete_storage_bucketno sensitive capabilitydeploy_coolify_applicationno sensitive capabilitydeploy_edge_functionno sensitive capabilitydeploy_supabase_to_coolifyno sensitive capabilityget_auth_configno sensitive capabilityget_coolify_applicationno sensitive capabilityget_coolify_logsno sensitive capabilityget_coolify_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_deployment_statusno sensitive capabilityget_migration_statusno sensitive capabilityget_supabase_versionno sensitive capabilityinvoke_edge_functionno sensitive capabilitylist_coolify_applicationsno sensitive capabilitylist_coolify_servicesno sensitive capabilitylist_edge_functionsno sensitive capabilitylist_migrationsno sensitive capabilitylist_storage_bucketsno sensitive capabilityrestart_coolify_applicationno sensitive capabilityrollback_last_migrationsno sensitive capabilityrollback_migration_with_down_sqlno sensitive capabilityrollback_to_versionno sensitive capabilitystart_coolify_applicationno sensitive capabilitystart_coolify_serviceno sensitive capabilitystop_coolify_applicationno sensitive capabilitystop_coolify_serviceno sensitive capabilitysupabase_db_diffno sensitive capabilitysupabase_db_pushno sensitive capabilitysupabase_db_resetno sensitive capabilitysupabase_functions_deployno sensitive capabilitysupabase_functions_serveno sensitive capabilitysupabase_gen_typesno sensitive capabilitysupabase_initno sensitive capabilitysupabase_linkno sensitive capabilitysupabase_migration_listno sensitive capabilitysupabase_migration_newno sensitive capabilitysupabase_migration_repairno sensitive capabilitysupabase_startno sensitive capabilitysupabase_statusno sensitive capabilitysupabase_stopno sensitive capabilityupdate_auth_configno sensitive capabilityupdate_coolify_application_envno sensitive capabilityupdate_supabase_deploymentno sensitive capabilityverify_setupno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (53 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.4 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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