Video (studiomeyer) MCP Server
@studiomeyer/mcp-video
npm
v1.0.3
Published by @studiomeyer — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Cinema-grade video production MCP server — 8 tools for recording, editing, effects, captions, TTS, and smart screenshots. Zero-config, works with any MCP client.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/ffmpeg-bin.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/ffmpeg-bin.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; const ENV_VAR = { ffmpeg: 'FFMPEG_PATH', ffprobe: 'FFPROBE_PATH', }; /**
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/ffmpeg-bin.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/ffmpeg-run.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/ffmpeg-run.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { logger } from './logger.js'; import { buildFfmpegArgs } from './ffmpeg-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/ffmpeg-run.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/ffmpeg-bin.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/ffmpeg-bin.ts:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; export type FfmpegBin = 'ffmpeg' | 'ffprobe'; const ENV_VAR: Record<FfmpegBin,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/ffmpeg-bin.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/ffmpeg-run.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/ffmpeg-run.ts:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { logger } from './logger.js'; import { buildFfmpegArgs, type FfmpegProto
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/ffmpeg-run.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/engine/editing.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/engine/editing.js:331`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/transcriptions', { method: 'POST', header
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/engine/editing.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/engine/tts.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/engine/tts.js:141`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/speech', { method: 'POST', headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/engine/tts.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/tools/engine/editing.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/engine/editing.ts:520`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/transcriptions', { method: 'POST', headers: { Aut
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/engine/editing.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/tools/engine/tts.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/engine/tts.ts:228`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/speech', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Cont
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/engine/tts.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/lib/ffmpeg-run.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/lib/ffmpeg-run.test.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: vi.fn()); vi.mock('node:child_process', () => ({ execFile: execFileMock })); // IMPORTANT: import AFTER vi.mock so the m
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/ffmpeg-run.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-deps.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-deps.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; const deps = [ { name: 'ffmpeg', cmd: 'ffmpeg -version', required: true },
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-deps.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/lib/ffmpeg-run.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/lib/ffmpeg-run.test.ts:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: i.fn()); vi.mock('node:child_process', () => ({ execFile: execFileMock })); // IMPORTANT: import AFTER vi.mock so the
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/ffmpeg-run.test.ts
Tools 8
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
video_audiono sensitive capabilityvideo_colorno sensitive capabilityvideo_composeno sensitive capabilityvideo_editno sensitive capabilityvideo_recordno sensitive capabilityvideo_screenshotno sensitive capabilityvideo_speechno sensitive capabilityvideo_textno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (8 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @studiomeyer/mcp-video --onlineOther implementations of Video 6
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 7 side by side →
MCP server namespace - part of HLOS ecosystem
MCP Server for Sandbox AI video generation via Seedance
Video processing MCP server with AI-powered script generation using Tencent Cloud
Multi-platform video downloader and transcript extractor supporting YouTube, Vimeo, Twitter/X, TikTok, and other sites.
Compatibility installer for Kinocut, formerly mcp-video.
Security scan results for the Video (npm) MCP server.
More in Design & Media
Turn designs into shipped parts: quote 3D printing, CNC, and decals, then check out.
Aleph's official SiliconFlow media-generation MCP server (image / video / TTS)
MCP server for image generation using Google Gemini AI
Ambience AI MCP Server - Generate images, videos, and audio through Model Context Protocol
MCP server exposing every endpoint of the AstroWay Calculation API as tools — natal, synastry, transits, Vedic dashas, Tarot, Numerology, Human Design, AI horoscopes — for Claude Desktop, Cursor and any MCP-compatible AI agent.
Audio-guide and trip-planning tools for 1,100+ cities from Audiala. Free, no API key.