GitLab (Structured World) (structured-world) MCP Server
@structured-world/gitlab-mcp
npm
v9.1.1
Source verified
Published by structured-world — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Advanced server for working with GitLab.
Started at 100 and nothing was deducted: the deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the published surface it inspected. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower the score.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cli/docker/container-runtime.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/docker/container-runtime.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/cli/docker/container-runtime.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cli/docker/docker-utils.d.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/docker/docker-utils.d.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/cli/docker/docker-utils.d.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cli/docker/docker-utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/docker/docker-utils.js:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/cli/docker/docker-utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cli/init/wizard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/init/wizard.js:211`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/cli/init/wizard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cli/install/detector.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/install/detector.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/cli/install/detector.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cli/install/installers.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/install/installers.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/cli/install/installers.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/src/cli/init/browser.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/init/browser.js:7`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import(m)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/cli/init/browser.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v9.1.1 latest |
A 100/100 | 7 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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