Strata (kytheros) MCP Server
strata-mcp
npm
v2.3.0
Published by kytheros — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local memory layer for AI agents — coding assistants over MCP, game NPCs over REST
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 11.7 = 88. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11.7 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×4 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 88 − 11 = 77. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:886`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: etect } = await import("child_process"); let hasClaude = false; let hasGemini = false;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/deploy-gcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/deploy-gcp.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { createInterface } from "readline"; import { patchTemplate, detectTier,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/deploy-gcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/deploy.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/deploy.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { createInterface } from "readline"; import { randomBytes } from "crypto"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/deploy.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/distill.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/distill.js:373`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import("child_process"); for (const model of MODELS_TO_PULL) { if (availableModels.i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/distill.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/download.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/download.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, copyFileSync, chmodSync, unlink
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/download.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/init-gemini.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/init-gemini.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = dirname(__f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/init-gemini.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/reasoning/providers/anthropic-adapter.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/reasoning/providers/anthropic-adapter.js:173`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reasoning/providers/anthropic-adapter.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/reasoning/providers/openai-adapter.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/reasoning/providers/openai-adapter.js:107`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions", { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reasoning/providers/openai-adapter.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/deploy-gcp.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/deploy-gcp.js:106`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .."); try { execSync(`gcloud services enable ${apiList} --project=${projectId}`, { stdio: "pipe"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/deploy-gcp.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/deploy.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/deploy.js:184`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`npx wrangler d1 create ${dbName} --account-id ${accountId}`, { cwd: outDir, encoding:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/deploy.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/distill.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/distill.js:381`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`ollama pull ${model}`, { stdio: "inherit" }); console.log(` OK ${mod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/distill.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/download.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/download.js:167`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`npm install -g "${tempFile}"`, { stdio: "inherit" }); } catch {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/download.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:940`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } await import(hookModule); break; } case "deploy": { const targ
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (templates/aws/test/e2e/helpers/cognito-token.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`templates/aws/test/e2e/helpers/cognito-token.ts:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { CognitoIdentityProviderClient, AdminInitiateAuthCommand, ListUser
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server templates/aws/test/e2e/helpers/cognito-token.ts
Tools 15
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
search_historyingests untrusted inputdelete_memoryno sensitive capabilityfind_patternsno sensitive capabilityfind_solutionsno sensitive capabilityget_project_contextno sensitive capabilityget_search_procedureno sensitive capabilityget_session_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_user_profileno sensitive capabilityingest_documentno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capability
Show 5 more tools ↓
reason_over_queryno sensitive capabilitysearch_eventsno sensitive capabilitysemantic_searchno sensitive capabilitystore_documentno sensitive capabilitystore_memoryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.0 latest |
C 77/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan strata-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Strata 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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