Storj Uplink MCP Server
storj-uplink-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by shivamkumar99 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Storj decentralized storage — use Storj directly from Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code Copilot, and any MCP-compatible AI client. Upload, download, list, share, and manage files on Storj with natural language.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/utils.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils.js:89`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: al', '.env.production', '.netrc', '.npmrc', '.bash_history', '.zsh_history', ]; export function validateFilePath(fil
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([download_text, download_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [download_text, download_file] → sinks [upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow download_text → upload_file
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { createRequire } from 'node:module'; import { arch, platform } from 'nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"storj-uplink-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package storj-uplink-mcp
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_fileingests untrusted inputdownload_textingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egresscopy_objectno sensitive capabilitycreate_bucketno sensitive capabilitydelete_bucketno sensitive capabilitydelete_bucketsno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_share_urlno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
grep_objectno sensitive capabilitylist_bucketsno sensitive capabilitylist_objectsno sensitive capabilitymove_objectno sensitive capabilitypeek_object_headno sensitive capabilitypeek_object_tailno sensitive capabilityserialize_accessno sensitive capabilityshare_accessno sensitive capabilitystat_objectno sensitive capabilityupdate_metadatano sensitive capabilityupload_textno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan storj-uplink-mcp --onlineMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.