Stitch Mcp Auto — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "stitch-mcp-auto",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "stitch-mcp-auto"
},
"server": {
"name": "stitch-mcp-auto"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 83,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`index.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "index.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require(\"child_process\"); const fs = require(\"fs\"); const path = require(\"path\"); const os = require(\"os\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "index.js",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (auth.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`auth.js:399`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "auth.js"
},
"evidence": "t tokenResponse = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', { method: 'POST',",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "auth.js",
"line": 399,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`index.js:329`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "index.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Conte",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "index.js",
"line": 329,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (index.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`index.js:678`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "index.js"
},
"evidence": "try { execSync(`${openCmd} \"${authUrl.toString()}\"`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); } catch (e) {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "index.js",
"line": 678,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`setup.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "setup.js"
},
"evidence": "ync, spawn } = require('child_process'); // Config const CONFIG_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.stitch-mcp-auto');",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "setup.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "design",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prompt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "device",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "style",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "design-system",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reference_screen_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "design-flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "design-qa",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screen_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "level",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "design-export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "token_format",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "component_format",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_workspace_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_workspace_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_workspace_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch_screen_code",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "fetch_screen_image",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "extract_design_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_design_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_design_tokens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_responsive_variant",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_generate_screens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_accessibility",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_designs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_components",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_trending_design",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_style_guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_design_system",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_design_asset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrate_design",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_antigravity_auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a568d2194ed03139157aee8351f59642bbc247e5805c1d0a5151f592f5abb372",
"stats": {
"tools": 33,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 3,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}