Stigmer MCP Server
@stigmer/mcp-server
npm
v3.13.0
Published by @stigmer — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for the Stigmer platform — exposes Stigmer agents, skills, MCP servers, and workflows as MCP tools and resources
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_environment]) and tools that can send data out ([send_channel_message]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_environment] → sinks [send_channel_message]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_environment → send_channel_message
high Dynamic code execution in server code (cli/mcp-server-stigmer.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`cli/mcp-server-stigmer.js:8`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Code,sch));let validate=new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`,`${names_1.default.scope}`,sourceCode)(this,this.scope.ge
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli/mcp-server-stigmer.js
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_environmentreads sensitive datasend_channel_messagenetwork egressapply_agentno sensitive capabilityapply_environmentno sensitive capabilityapply_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilityapply_workflowno sensitive capabilitycancel_executionno sensitive capabilitydelete_agentno sensitive capabilitydelete_environmentno sensitive capabilitydelete_mcp_serverno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
delete_skillno sensitive capabilitydelete_workflowno sensitive capabilityescalate_to_humanno sensitive capabilityget_agentno sensitive capabilityget_agent_executionno sensitive capabilityget_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilityget_skillno sensitive capabilityget_task_kindno sensitive capabilityget_task_kind_registryno sensitive capabilityget_workflowno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_executionno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_execution_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_pending_approvalsno sensitive capabilitylist_skill_versionsno sensitive capabilitylist_workflow_versionsno sensitive capabilityrememberno sensitive capabilityrun_agentno sensitive capabilityrun_workflowno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysubmit_agent_execution_approvalno sensitive capabilitysubmit_workflow_task_approvalno sensitive capabilitytag_workflow_versionno sensitive capabilityvalidate_workflow_yamlno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.13.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v3.12.9 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v3.12.8 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v3.12.6 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v3.12.4 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v3.12.3 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v3.11.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v3.10.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v3.9.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v3.8.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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