Stellify MCP Server
@stellisoft/stellify-mcp
npm
v1.0.6
Published by @stellisoft — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Stellify - AI-native code generation platform
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Tool "run_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_code
medium Tool "create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool create_file
medium Tool "save_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "save_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "save_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool save_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "create_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_file
low Mutating tool "save_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "save_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool save_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "run_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_code
low Unconstrained path parameter "directory" on "delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "delete_file" takes a path parameter "directory" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool delete_file · inputSchema.properties.directory
Tools 60
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_filewrites filesdelete_filewrites filesrun_coderuns code / shellsave_filewrites filesadd_method_bodyno sensitive capabilityadd_statement_codeno sensitive capabilityanalyze_attributesno sensitive capabilityanalyze_performanceno sensitive capabilityanalyze_qualityno sensitive capabilitybroadcast_element_commandno sensitive capability
Show 50 more tools ↓
create_directoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_elementno sensitive capabilitycreate_methodno sensitive capabilitycreate_resourcesno sensitive capabilitycreate_routeno sensitive capabilitycreate_statementno sensitive capabilitycreate_statement_with_codeno sensitive capabilitydelete_elementno sensitive capabilitydelete_methodno sensitive capabilitydelete_routeno sensitive capabilitydelete_settingno sensitive capabilitydelete_statementno sensitive capabilityget_assembled_codeno sensitive capabilityget_directoryno sensitive capabilityget_elementno sensitive capabilityget_element_treeno sensitive capabilityget_fileno sensitive capabilityget_methodno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_routeno sensitive capabilityget_settingno sensitive capabilityget_statementno sensitive capabilityget_stellify_framework_apino sensitive capabilityhtml_to_elementsno sensitive capabilityinstall_packageno sensitive capabilitylist_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_forksno sensitive capabilityload_toolsno sensitive capabilitypublishno sensitive capabilityrename_variableno sensitive capabilityreplace_method_bodyno sensitive capabilityrequest_capabilityno sensitive capabilityreuse_codeno sensitive capabilityrun_migrationno sensitive capabilityrun_testsno sensitive capabilitysave_directoryno sensitive capabilitysave_methodno sensitive capabilitysave_routeno sensitive capabilitysave_settingno sensitive capabilitysave_statementno sensitive capabilitysearch_attributesno sensitive capabilitysearch_codeno sensitive capabilitysearch_elementsno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_methodsno sensitive capabilitysearch_routesno sensitive capabilityset_capabilityno sensitive capabilitysubmit_codeno sensitive capabilityupdate_elementno sensitive capabilityvariant_countsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.6 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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