Stella MCP Server
stella-mcp
PyPI
v0.14.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for creating and manipulating Stella system dynamics models (.stmx files)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (stella_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`stella_mcp/server.py:293`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ") _workspace_store.require(supplied) return supplied async def call_tool( name: str, arguments: dict[
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server stella_mcp/server.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (stella_mcp/session_store.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`stella_mcp/session_store.py:131`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: revoked") self.require(workspace_id) del self._workspaces[workspace_id] self._remember_tombston
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server stella_mcp/session_store.py
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_auxno sensitive capabilityadd_connectorno sensitive capabilityadd_flowno sensitive capabilityadd_stockno sensitive capabilityadd_to_moduleno sensitive capabilityadd_variablesno sensitive capabilityauto_place_module_boxesno sensitive capabilitybuild_modelno sensitive capabilitycalibrateno sensitive capabilitycompare_scenariosno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
create_modelno sensitive capabilitycreate_moduleno sensitive capabilitycreate_workspaceno sensitive capabilitydelete_modelno sensitive capabilitydelete_moduleno sensitive capabilitydelete_variableno sensitive capabilityget_model_xmlno sensitive capabilityget_template_infono sensitive capabilityinspect_modelno sensitive capabilitylist_connectorsno sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_modulesno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_variablesno sensitive capabilityload_templateno sensitive capabilityread_modelno sensitive capabilityremove_from_moduleno sensitive capabilityrename_moduleno sensitive capabilityrename_variableno sensitive capabilityrender_diagramno sensitive capabilityrevoke_workspaceno sensitive capabilitysave_as_templateno sensitive capabilitysave_modelno sensitive capabilitysensitivity_analysisno sensitive capabilityset_connector_routingno sensitive capabilityset_module_styleno sensitive capabilityset_module_viewno sensitive capabilityset_sim_specsno sensitive capabilitysimulateno sensitive capabilitysync_connectors_from_equationsno sensitive capabilityupdate_auxno sensitive capabilityupdate_flowno sensitive capabilityupdate_stockno sensitive capabilityvalidate_modelno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.14.0 latest |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.12.0 |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan stella-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Generates production-ready UI components from natural language, inspired by v0.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.