Stata (sepinetam) MCP Server
stata-mcp
PyPI
v1.24.0
Published by sepinetam — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP-for-Stata: one-command install of a Stata MCP server for Claude Code, Codex, OpenClaw, and 7+ AI agents. Run Stata do-files through natural language.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py:456`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: elf.cwd) proc = subprocess.Popen( [self.STATA_CLI], # Launch the Stata CLI stdin=subpro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/stata_mcp/utils/doctor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/stata_mcp/utils/doctor.py:156`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: command_result = subprocess.run( [uv_path, "--version"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/stata_mcp/utils/doctor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/stata_mcp/utils/installer/installer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/stata_mcp/utils/installer/installer.py:428`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( full_cmd, check=True, capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/stata_mcp/utils/installer/installer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/stata_mcp/utils/update.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/stata_mcp/utils/update.py:158`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=180, check=False) if res
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/stata_mcp/utils/update.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/stata_mcp/utils/usable.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/stata_mcp/utils/usable.py:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: inux proc = subprocess.Popen( [stata_cli_path], stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/stata_mcp/utils/usable.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/stata_mcp/utils/doctor.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/stata_mcp/utils/doctor.py:201`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(package) installed[package] = True except ImportError:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/stata_mcp/utils/doctor.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.24.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.23.1 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v1.23.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v1.22.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.21.4 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v1.21.3 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
v1.21.2 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v1.21.1 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan stata-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Stata 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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