Stampede — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.7.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.7.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"target": {
"id": "stampede-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "stampede-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "stampede-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 90,
"threatScore": 98,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect",
"appliedPenalty": 5
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([list_collections, list_directories]) co-exist with external-action tools ([post_comment, add_reaction, remove_reaction]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"list_collections",
"list_directories"
],
"sinks": [
"post_comment",
"add_reaction",
"remove_reaction"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"stampede-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "stampede-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"list_collections",
"list_directories"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"post_comment",
"add_reaction",
"remove_reaction"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_stamps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stamp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_stamps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_profiles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_all",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stamp_discussion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stamp_holders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stamp_dispensers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_profile_stamps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_profile_favorites",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_profile_collections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_profile_followers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_profile_following",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_collections",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_collection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_directories",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_directory_indexes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_directory_stamps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "like_stamp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unlike_stamp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "favorite_stamp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unfavorite_stamp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "post_comment",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"post\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "add_reaction",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"post\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "remove_reaction",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"post\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "960d342e1848f4ea6f6e6a7b96c7b650ecbca4c27fc6d80ca6b9f5505271b796",
"stats": {
"tools": 27,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}