Stackchan MCP Server
stackchan-mcp
PyPI
v0.17.0
Published by kisaragi-mochi — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Two-faced MCP gateway for StackChan (xiaozhi-esp32): bridges stdio MCP clients to the ESP32 over WebSocket + HTTP.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (stackchan_mcp/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`stackchan_mcp/cli.py:236`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["lsof", f"-iTCP:{port}", "-sTCP:LISTEN", "-Fpcn"], capt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server stackchan_mcp/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (stackchan_mcp/ownership.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`stackchan_mcp/ownership.py:128`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["ps", "-o", "lstart=", "-p", str(pid)], capture_output=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server stackchan_mcp/ownership.py
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
beat_clip_saveno sensitive capabilitybeat_meta_snapshotno sensitive capabilitybeat_mode_startno sensitive capabilitybeat_mode_stopno sensitive capabilitybeat_mode_updateno sensitive capabilitycheck_vm_enno sensitive capabilityclear_ledsno sensitive capabilitygateway_config_getno sensitive capabilitygateway_config_setno sensitive capabilityget_device_infono sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
get_head_anglesno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilityget_touch_sensor_enabledno sensitive capabilityget_touch_stateno sensitive capabilitygpio_testno sensitive capabilityi2c_readno sensitive capabilityi2c_scanno sensitive capabilityi2c_writeno sensitive capabilityi2c_write_readno sensitive capabilitylistenno sensitive capabilityload_avatar_setno sensitive capabilitymove_headno sensitive capabilityport_b_ws2812_clearno sensitive capabilityport_b_ws2812_initno sensitive capabilityport_b_ws2812_refreshno sensitive capabilityport_b_ws2812_set_pixelno sensitive capabilityport_b_ws2812_set_stripno sensitive capabilityport_c_ws2812_clearno sensitive capabilityport_c_ws2812_initno sensitive capabilityport_c_ws2812_refreshno sensitive capabilityport_c_ws2812_set_pixelno sensitive capabilityport_c_ws2812_set_stripno sensitive capabilitysayno sensitive capabilityset_all_ledsno sensitive capabilityset_auto_torque_releaseno sensitive capabilityset_avatarno sensitive capabilityset_blinkno sensitive capabilityset_brightnessno sensitive capabilityset_ledno sensitive capabilityset_ledsno sensitive capabilityset_mouthno sensitive capabilityset_mouth_sequenceno sensitive capabilityset_servo_torqueno sensitive capabilityset_touch_sensor_enabledno sensitive capabilityset_volumeno sensitive capabilitystackchan_follow_led_streamno sensitive capabilitystackchan_follow_pose_streamno sensitive capabilitytake_photono sensitive capabilityuart_diagno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.17.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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