Sshand — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "sshand",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "sshand"
},
"server": {
"name": "sshand"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write",
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: ssh_download_file → ssh_read_file → ssh_run_command. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "ssh_download_file → ssh_read_file → ssh_run_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"ssh_get_local_info",
"ssh_download_file"
],
"sources": [
"ssh_read_file"
],
"sinks": [
"ssh_run_command",
"ssh_upload_file"
],
"path": [
"ssh_download_file",
"ssh_read_file",
"ssh_run_command"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "ssh_download_file",
"to": "ssh_read_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "ssh_read_file",
"to": "ssh_run_command",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (host_config.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`host_config.py:62`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "host_config.py"
},
"evidence": "\"(e.g., '~/.ssh/id_rsa', '/home/user/.ssh/deploy_key').\" ), ) passphrase: str | None = Field(",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "host_config.py",
"line": 62,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (manage.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`manage.py:239`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "manage.py"
},
"evidence": "path\", default=\"~/.ssh/id_rsa\", required=True) passphrase = questionary.password( \"Key passphrase (",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "manage.py",
"line": 239,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (server.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`server.py:247`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "server.py"
},
"evidence": "(e.g., '~/.ssh/id_rsa'). key_passphrase: Optional passphrase to decrypt an encrypted private key.",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "server.py",
"line": 247,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (setup_wizard.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`setup_wizard.py:375`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "setup_wizard.py"
},
"evidence": "vate key path\", \"~/.ssh/id_rsa\") passphrase = _ask(\"Key passphrase (leave blank if none)\") auth = hc.",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "setup_wizard.py",
"line": 375,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_run_command\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_run_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"run_command\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_run_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (platform_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`platform_utils.py:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "platform_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"sc\", \"query\", \"ssh-agent\"], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "platform_utils.py",
"line": 67,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_write_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_write_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_host_config.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_host_config.py:148`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_host_config.py"
},
"evidence": "key_file = ssh_dir / \"id_rsa\" key_file.write_text(\"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\\n...\") monkeypatch.set",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "tests/test_host_config.py",
"line": 148,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_ssh_client.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_ssh_client.py:112`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_ssh_client.py"
},
"evidence": "key_path = key_file / \"id_rsa\" key_path.write_text(\"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\\n...\") return str(key_p",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "tests/test_ssh_client.py",
"line": 112,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_run_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_run_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_run_command"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_write_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_write_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"ssh_get_local_info",
"ssh_download_file"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"ssh_read_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"ssh_run_command",
"ssh_upload_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"ssh_download_file",
"ssh_read_file",
"ssh_run_command"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: ssh_download_file → ssh_read_file → ssh_run_command."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ssh_list_hosts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_add_host",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_remove_host",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_test_connection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_run_command",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"run_command\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_write_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"write_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_list_directory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_get_local_info",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_download_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b90635ce2feb19672eb133350b28c5b7e3f58d5cc7398f78489944d7b5cd384b",
"stats": {
"tools": 11,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 6,
"medium": 1,
"low": 4,
"info": 0
}
}
}