Ssh Agent MCP Server
ssh-agent-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.3
Published by zhijun — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
SSH Agent MCP服务 - 支持SSH连接管理、命令执行和SFTP文件传输的完整MCP服务器
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 17
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (config_loader.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`config_loader.py:152`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _key": "/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa", "description": "生产环境服务器", "tags": ["production", "criti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server config_loader.py
high Tool "ssh_execute" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_execute" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_execute
high Tool "ssh_start_async_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_start_async_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_start_async_command
high Tool "ssh_get_command_status" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_get_command_status" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_get_command_status
high Tool "ssh_terminate_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_terminate_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_terminate_command
high Tool "ssh_start_interactive" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_start_interactive" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_start_interactive
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([ssh_download_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([ssh_execute, ssh_start_async_command, ssh_get_command_status, ssh_terminate_command, ssh_start_interactive, ssh_upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [ssh_download_file] → sinks [ssh_execute, ssh_start_async_command, ssh_get_command_status, ssh_terminate_command, ssh_start_interactive, ssh_upload_fi
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow ssh_download_file → ssh_execute
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "ssh_execute"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "ssh_execute" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ssh_execute · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "ssh_start_async_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "ssh_start_async_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ssh_start_async_command · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command_id" on "ssh_get_command_status"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "ssh_get_command_status" takes a command-shaped parameter "command_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ssh_get_command_status · inputSchema.properties.command_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command_id" on "ssh_terminate_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "ssh_terminate_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ssh_terminate_command · inputSchema.properties.command_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "ssh_start_interactive"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "ssh_start_interactive" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ssh_start_interactive · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "ssh_execute" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_execute" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_execute
low Mutating tool "ssh_start_async_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_start_async_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_start_async_command
low Mutating tool "ssh_get_command_status" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_get_command_status" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_get_command_status
low Mutating tool "ssh_terminate_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_terminate_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_terminate_command
low Mutating tool "ssh_start_interactive" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_start_interactive" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_start_interactive
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ssh_download_fileingests untrusted inputssh_executeruns code / shellssh_get_command_statusruns code / shellssh_start_async_commandruns code / shellssh_start_interactiveruns code / shellssh_terminate_commandruns code / shellssh_upload_filenetwork egressssh_auto_connectno sensitive capabilityssh_cleanup_commandsno sensitive capabilityssh_connectno sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
ssh_connect_by_config_hostno sensitive capabilityssh_connect_by_nameno sensitive capabilityssh_create_remote_directoryno sensitive capabilityssh_disconnectno sensitive capabilityssh_disconnect_allno sensitive capabilityssh_get_interactive_outputno sensitive capabilityssh_get_remote_file_infono sensitive capabilityssh_list_async_commandsno sensitive capabilityssh_list_configno sensitive capabilityssh_list_connectionsno sensitive capabilityssh_list_interactive_sessionsno sensitive capabilityssh_list_remote_directoryno sensitive capabilityssh_remove_remote_fileno sensitive capabilityssh_rename_remote_pathno sensitive capabilityssh_send_inputno sensitive capabilityssh_statusno sensitive capabilityssh_terminate_interactiveno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 17 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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