Sqlite Mcp Server Enhanced MCP Server
sqlite-mcp-server-enhanced
PyPI
v2.6.5
Published by neverinfamous — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (test_runner.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test_runner.py:162`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cript result = subprocess.run(cmd, check=False) return result.returncode except Keyboar
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test_runner.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (test_runner.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`test_runner.py:41`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(module) except ImportError: missing.append(module) i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test_runner.py
Tools 73
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
advanced_searchno sensitive capabilityanalyze_csv_schemano sensitive capabilityanalyze_databaseno sensitive capabilityanalyze_json_schemano sensitive capabilityanalyze_vector_indexno sensitive capabilityappend_insightno sensitive capabilitybackup_databaseno sensitive capabilitybatch_similarity_searchno sensitive capabilitycalculate_similarityno sensitive capabilitycorrelation_analysisno sensitive capability
Show 63 more tools ↓
create_csv_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_embeddings_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_enhanced_csv_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_fts_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_json_collection_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_rtree_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_series_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_spatial_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_vector_indexno sensitive capabilitydatabase_statsno sensitive capabilitydescribe_tableno sensitive capabilitydescriptive_statisticsno sensitive capabilitydistribution_analysisno sensitive capabilitydrop_virtual_tableno sensitive capabilityfts_searchno sensitive capabilityfuzzy_matchno sensitive capabilitygeometry_operationsno sensitive capabilityhybrid_searchno sensitive capabilityhypothesis_testingno sensitive capabilityimport_shapefileno sensitive capabilityindex_usage_statsno sensitive capabilityintegrity_checkno sensitive capabilityjson_insertno sensitive capabilityjson_mergeno sensitive capabilityjson_queryno sensitive capabilityjson_selectno sensitive capabilityjson_updateno sensitive capabilityjson_validate_pathno sensitive capabilitylist_tablesno sensitive capabilitylist_virtual_tablesno sensitive capabilityload_spatialiteno sensitive capabilitymoving_averagesno sensitive capabilityoptimize_vector_searchno sensitive capabilityoutlier_detectionno sensitive capabilitypercentile_analysisno sensitive capabilityphonetic_matchno sensitive capabilitypragma_compile_optionsno sensitive capabilitypragma_database_listno sensitive capabilitypragma_optimizeno sensitive capabilitypragma_settingsno sensitive capabilitypragma_table_infono sensitive capabilityread_queryno sensitive capabilityrebuild_fts_indexno sensitive capabilityrebuild_vector_indexno sensitive capabilityregex_extractno sensitive capabilityregex_replaceno sensitive capabilityregression_analysisno sensitive capabilityrestore_databaseno sensitive capabilitysemantic_searchno sensitive capabilityspatial_analysisno sensitive capabilityspatial_indexno sensitive capabilityspatial_queryno sensitive capabilitystore_embeddingno sensitive capabilitytest_jsonb_conversionno sensitive capabilitytext_normalizeno sensitive capabilitytext_similarityno sensitive capabilitytext_validationno sensitive capabilityvacuum_databaseno sensitive capabilityvalidate_jsonno sensitive capabilityverify_backupno sensitive capabilityvirtual_table_infono sensitive capabilitywrite_queryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (73 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.6.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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