Sqemo MCP Server
sqemo-mcp
npm
v1.2.1
Published by sqemo — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 22 = 78. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −22 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 78 − 4 = 74. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Grade capped: 1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (dist/chunk-VVDZ2CVM.js)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `dist/chunk-VVDZ2CVM.js:192`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/chunk-VVDZ2CVM.js
low Unconstrained path parameter "file" on "create_erd"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "create_erd" takes a path parameter "file" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool create_erd · inputSchema.properties.file
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_erdreads sensitive dataimport_sqlreads sensitive dataauto_layoutno sensitive capabilitycheck_namingno sensitive capabilitydelete_attributeno sensitive capabilitydelete_dictionary_wordno sensitive capabilitydelete_domainno sensitive capabilitydelete_entityno sensitive capabilitydelete_relationshipno sensitive capabilitydiff_erdsno sensitive capabilityexport_alter_sqlno sensitive capabilityexport_dbmlno sensitive capabilityexport_sqlno sensitive capabilitygenerate_physical_nameno sensitive capabilityget_entityno sensitive capabilityget_erd_overviewno sensitive capabilityimport_dbmlno sensitive capabilitylint_erdno sensitive capabilitylist_domainsno sensitive capabilitylist_entitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_erdsno sensitive capabilitylist_proposalsno sensitive capabilitylist_relationshipsno sensitive capabilitylist_workspacesno sensitive capabilitypropose_dictionary_wordno sensitive capabilitysearch_dictionaryno sensitive capabilityupdate_naming_rulesno sensitive capabilityupsert_attributeno sensitive capabilityupsert_dictionary_wordno sensitive capabilityupsert_domainno sensitive capabilityupsert_entityno sensitive capabilityupsert_relationshipno sensitive capabilityvalidate_erdno sensitive capabilitywithdraw_proposalno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.1 latest |
C 74/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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