Sprucelab MCP Server
sprucelab
PyPI
v0.1.5.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 12 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: agent_tools_manifest → list_files → capabilities. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow agent_tools_manifest → list_files → capabilities
high Shell/command execution in server code (sprucelab/cli/dev.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`sprucelab/cli/dev.py:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .py", *args] return subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=_backend_dir(), capture_output=capture,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server sprucelab/cli/dev.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_entrypoint.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_entrypoint.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: <args>``.""" return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, *ENTRY_MODULE, *args], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_mcp_entrypoint.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/conftest.py:77`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: module = __import__(dotted, fromlist=["console"]) except ImportError: continue
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/conftest.py
Tools 50
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
capabilitiesingests untrusted inputnetwork egressagent_tools_manifestingests untrusted inputcreate_issuenetwork egresscreate_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressdisable_webhooknetwork egresseir_catalogingests untrusted inputeir_presetsingests untrusted inputlist_filesreads sensitive datatest_webhooknetwork egress
Show 40 more tools ↓
upload_filenetwork egressadd_memberno sensitive capabilityclaim_conflictsno sensitive capabilityclassify_typesno sensitive capabilitycreate_scopeno sensitive capabilityeir_add_ruleno sensitive capabilityeir_apply_presetno sensitive capabilityeir_remove_ruleno sensitive capabilityeir_rulesno sensitive capabilityeir_set_rulesno sensitive capabilityextraction_logno sensitive capabilityget_claimno sensitive capabilityissues_from_verificationno sensitive capabilitylist_claimsno sensitive capabilitylist_deliveriesno sensitive capabilitylist_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_observationsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_scopesno sensitive capabilitylist_tenant_tokensno sensitive capabilitylist_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitymint_tenant_tokenno sensitive capabilitypromote_claimno sensitive capabilityredeliverno sensitive capabilityreject_claimno sensitive capabilityremove_memberno sensitive capabilityreprocess_fileno sensitive capabilityresolve_issueno sensitive capabilityrevoke_tenant_tokenno sensitive capabilityscaffold_projectno sensitive capabilityshow_fileno sensitive capabilityshow_issueno sensitive capabilityshow_projectno sensitive capabilitysupersede_claimno sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capabilityverify_dry_runno sensitive capabilityverify_modelno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (50 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.5.0 latest |
B 88/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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