Splitwise (chrischall) MCP Server
splitwise-mcp
npm
v2.4.1
Source verified
Published by chrischall — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Splitwise MCP server for Claude — developed and maintained by AI (Claude Code)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/bundle.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.js:2954`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bundle.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bundle.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.js:35423`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ] : null; } exec(e2, t2) { let n2 = this.callbacks.get(t2.key); if (!n2) { if (/^[
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bundle.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([sw_get_receipt]) co-exist with external-action tools ([sw_create_comment]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [sw_get_receipt] → sinks [sw_create_comment]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow sw_get_receipt → sw_create_comment
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
sw_create_commentnetwork egresssw_get_receiptingests untrusted inputsw_add_user_to_groupno sensitive capabilitysw_create_expenseno sensitive capabilitysw_create_friendno sensitive capabilitysw_create_groupno sensitive capabilitysw_delete_commentno sensitive capabilitysw_delete_expenseno sensitive capabilitysw_delete_friendno sensitive capabilitysw_delete_groupno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
sw_get_categoriesno sensitive capabilitysw_get_commentsno sensitive capabilitysw_get_currenciesno sensitive capabilitysw_get_current_userno sensitive capabilitysw_get_expenseno sensitive capabilitysw_get_groupno sensitive capabilitysw_get_notificationsno sensitive capabilitysw_get_userno sensitive capabilitysw_list_expensesno sensitive capabilitysw_list_friendsno sensitive capabilitysw_list_groupsno sensitive capabilitysw_remove_user_from_groupno sensitive capabilitysw_undelete_expenseno sensitive capabilitysw_undelete_groupno sensitive capabilitysw_update_expenseno sensitive capabilitysw_update_userno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.4.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.3.0 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v2.2.3 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v2.2.1 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v2.1.6 |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v2.1.5 |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v2.1.4 |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v2.1.3 |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan splitwise-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Splitwise 3
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