Spimov MCP Server

spimov-mcp PyPI v0.6.0

Published by spimov-ai — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Trust grade
B
87/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 87/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade threat 98 − adoption risk = 87/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 2.1 = 98. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

2. Client adoption risk — 98 − 11 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−5 publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect
inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 7

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_video → create_dub ⇒ dub_from_url. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow download_video → create_dub → dub_from_url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "dub_youtube"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "dub_youtube" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool dub_youtube · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "target_lang" on "dub_youtube"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "dub_youtube" takes a URL/host parameter "target_lang" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool dub_youtube · inputSchema.properties.target_lang

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "dub_from_url"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "dub_from_url" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool dub_from_url · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "target_lang" on "dub_from_url"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "dub_from_url" takes a URL/host parameter "target_lang" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool dub_from_url · inputSchema.properties.target_lang

low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "create_dub"MTC-CAP-008

Tool "create_dub" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool create_dub · inputSchema.properties.file_path

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"spimov-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package spimov-mcp

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.6.0 latest B 87/100 7 1.7.0 2026-07-23

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MCP Trust Score: B · 87/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan spimov-mcp --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

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