Interactive Leetcode — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@sperekrestova/interactive-leetcode-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@sperekrestova/interactive-leetcode-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@sperekrestova/interactive-leetcode-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/runner/sandbox.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/runner/sandbox.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/runner/sandbox.js"
},
"evidence": "execFileCb } from \"node:child_process\"; import { access, constants as fsConstants } from \"node:fs/promises\"; import { pr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/runner/sandbox.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/runner/subprocess-runner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/runner/subprocess-runner.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/runner/subprocess-runner.js"
},
"evidence": "eCb, spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from \"node:fs/promises\"; import { tmpdi",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/runner/subprocess-runner.js",
"line": 22,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/utils/browser-launcher.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/utils/browser-launcher.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/utils/browser-launcher.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; /** * Opens the default browser to the specified URL using platform-specific co",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/utils/browser-launcher.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/leetcode/leetcode-global-service.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/leetcode/leetcode-global-service.js:474`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/leetcode/leetcode-global-service.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await axios.post(\"https://leetcode.com/graphql\", graphqlQuery, { headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/leetcode/leetcode-global-service.js",
"line": 474,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "start_leetcode_auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_leetcode_credentials",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_auth_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_contest_ranking",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_started",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_daily_challenge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_problem",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_problems",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_local_tests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "runner_doctor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_problem",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_hint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_session_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reset_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_problem_solutions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_problem_solution",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_solution",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_recent_submissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_recent_ac_submissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_problem_submission_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_problem_progress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_all_submissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a20f98c1dff5efaef566aa82112e43797995ad9590fffb82f111c662e60d446b",
"stats": {
"tools": 24,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}