specter-skills
npm
v0.11.1
Published by dirtcubeinteractive — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Claude Skills + MCP server for Specter — the game backend platform. `npx specter-skills init` installs the skills; `specter-mcp` runs the MCP server.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const PKG_ROOT = path.dirname(__dirname); const SKILLS_SRC = path.join(PKG_ROO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/cli.js
In the server's implementation (`mcp/src/auth.mjs:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync } from 'node:fs'; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/src/auth.mjs
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
specter_admin_callno sensitive capabilityspecter_claim_rewardno sensitive capabilityspecter_client_callno sensitive capabilityspecter_create_currencyno sensitive capabilityspecter_create_currency_conversionno sensitive capabilityspecter_create_currency_policyno sensitive capabilityspecter_create_eventno sensitive capabilityspecter_create_matchno sensitive capabilityspecter_create_missionno sensitive capabilityspecter_create_step_seriesno sensitive capabilityspecter_create_taskno sensitive capabilityspecter_create_time_seriesno sensitive capabilityspecter_delete_achievementno sensitive capabilityspecter_edit_currencyno sensitive capabilityspecter_edit_taskno sensitive capabilityspecter_generate_client_codeno sensitive capabilityspecter_get_player_stateno sensitive capabilityspecter_get_reward_historyno sensitive capabilityspecter_loginno sensitive capabilityspecter_schedule_achievementno sensitive capabilityspecter_send_eventno sensitive capabilityspecter_stop_achievementno sensitive capabilityspecter_test_achievementno sensitive capabilityspecter_update_entityno sensitive capabilityspecter_verify_setupno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.11.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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