Specloom MCP Server
specloom
npm
v5.3.0
Published by kpruntov — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Tool "loom_validate" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "loom_validate" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_code"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool loom_validate
low Mutating tool "loom_validate" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "loom_validate" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool loom_validate
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
loom_validateruns code / shellallno sensitive capabilityarchno sensitive capabilitycontextno sensitive capabilityhandshakeno sensitive capabilityidno sensitive capabilityimplno sensitive capabilityinfono sensitive capabilityinitno sensitive capabilityinputno sensitive capabilitylistno sensitive capabilityloadno sensitive capabilityloom_approveno sensitive capabilityloom_assignno sensitive capabilityloom_check_gateno sensitive capabilityloom_completeno sensitive capabilityloom_contextno sensitive capabilityloom_generateno sensitive capabilityloom_get_diffno sensitive capabilityloom_impactno sensitive capabilityloom_importno sensitive capabilityloom_infono sensitive capabilityloom_initno sensitive capabilityloom_list_reviewsno sensitive capabilityloom_nextno sensitive capabilityloom_startno sensitive capabilityloom_statusno sensitive capabilityloom_syncno sensitive capabilityloom_update_taskno sensitive capabilityloom_verifyno sensitive capabilitynextno sensitive capabilityplanningno sensitive capabilityprioritizeno sensitive capabilityprojectno sensitive capabilityreqno sensitive capabilityreviewno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilitytypeno sensitive capabilityverifyno sensitive capabilityvisionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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