Speclock MCP Server
speclock
npm
v5.8.0
Published by sgroy10 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Stop AI from breaking code you told it not to touch. Enforces .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, and AGENTS.md — not just suggests. Zero-config: npx speclock protect reads your existing AI rule files, extracts constraints, installs pre-commit hooks, and makes your
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/index.js:2667`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import("child_process"); const fs = await import("fs"); // Read current version const pkgPa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/git.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; // Safe git command execution — uses spawnSync with args array (no shell inject
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/git.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/pre-commit-semantic.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/pre-commit-semantic.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { readBrain } from "./storage.js"; import { analyzeConflict } from "./sem
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/pre-commit-semantic.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/core/llm-provider.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/core/llm-provider.js:66`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s; const resp = await fetch("https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions", { method: "POST", headers: { "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/llm-provider.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/index.js:2715`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: stdio: "pipe" }); execSync(`git commit -m "v${newVersion}"`, { cwd: root, stdio: "pipe" }); console.log(" D
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/index.js
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
speclock_add_decisionno sensitive capabilityspeclock_add_lockno sensitive capabilityspeclock_add_noteno sensitive capabilityspeclock_add_typed_lockno sensitive capabilityspeclock_apply_templateno sensitive capabilityspeclock_auditno sensitive capabilityspeclock_blast_radiusno sensitive capabilityspeclock_build_graphno sensitive capabilityspeclock_check_conflictno sensitive capabilityspeclock_check_typedno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
speclock_checkpointno sensitive capabilityspeclock_compile_specno sensitive capabilityspeclock_coverageno sensitive capabilityspeclock_detect_driftno sensitive capabilityspeclock_discover_rulesno sensitive capabilityspeclock_drift_scoreno sensitive capabilityspeclock_export_complianceno sensitive capabilityspeclock_get_changesno sensitive capabilityspeclock_get_contextno sensitive capabilityspeclock_get_eventsno sensitive capabilityspeclock_healthno sensitive capabilityspeclock_initno sensitive capabilityspeclock_list_sessionsno sensitive capabilityspeclock_list_sync_formatsno sensitive capabilityspeclock_list_typed_locksno sensitive capabilityspeclock_log_changeno sensitive capabilityspeclock_map_locksno sensitive capabilityspeclock_override_historyno sensitive capabilityspeclock_override_lockno sensitive capabilityspeclock_parse_diffno sensitive capabilityspeclock_policy_evaluateno sensitive capabilityspeclock_policy_manageno sensitive capabilityspeclock_protectno sensitive capabilityspeclock_remove_lockno sensitive capabilityspeclock_replayno sensitive capabilityspeclock_repo_statusno sensitive capabilityspeclock_reportno sensitive capabilityspeclock_review_patchno sensitive capabilityspeclock_review_patch_diffno sensitive capabilityspeclock_semantic_auditno sensitive capabilityspeclock_session_briefingno sensitive capabilityspeclock_session_summaryno sensitive capabilityspeclock_set_deploy_factsno sensitive capabilityspeclock_set_enforcementno sensitive capabilityspeclock_set_goalno sensitive capabilityspeclock_strengthenno sensitive capabilityspeclock_suggest_locksno sensitive capabilityspeclock_sync_rulesno sensitive capabilityspeclock_telemetryno sensitive capabilityspeclock_update_thresholdno sensitive capabilityspeclock_verify_auditno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.8.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v5.7.0 |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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