Specforge MCP Server
specforge-mcp
npm
v0.15.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 8 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/engine/auditor-security/electron-checks.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/auditor-security/electron-checks.js:76`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: suggestion: 'Remove all eval() calls. Use JSON.parse() or safer alternatives.', reference: 'Electron Sec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/auditor-security/electron-checks.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engine/actuals/git-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/actuals/git-analyzer.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; const SPEC_ID_PATTERN = /^SPEC-\d+/; const MAX_SESSION_GAP_MS = 2 * 60 * 60 * 10
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/actuals/git-analyzer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engine/dora-metrics/git-log.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/dora-metrics/git-log.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/dora-metrics/git-log.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engine/workflow-validator/git-flow.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/workflow-validator/git-flow.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; // === Helpers === function runGit(args, cwd) { try { return execSyn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/workflow-validator/git-flow.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/engine/actuals/git-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/actuals/git-analyzer.js:158`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = execSync(`git log --format="%H|%aI|%s" --numstat --all --grep="${specId}"`, { cwd: p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/actuals/git-analyzer.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/engine/workflow-validator/git-flow.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/workflow-validator/git-flow.js:7`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { return execSync(`git ${args}`, { cwd, encoding: 'utf-8', stdio: ['p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/workflow-validator/git-flow.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tools/git/git-helpers.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tools/git/git-helpers.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFileCb } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { knowledgeStore } from '../../sto
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/git/git-helpers.js
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
auditno sensitive capabilitychallenge_specno sensitive capabilitycheck_config_healthno sensitive capabilitycheck_versionsno sensitive capabilityclarify_requirementsno sensitive capabilityconsult_docsno sensitive capabilitycreate_specno sensitive capabilitydefine_ui_contractno sensitive capabilitydesign_schemano sensitive capabilitydetect_agentno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
detect_driftno sensitive capabilitydiscover_mcpsno sensitive capabilityestimateno sensitive capabilitygenerate_adrno sensitive capabilitygenerate_checklistno sensitive capabilitygenerate_execution_planno sensitive capabilitygenerate_orchestration_scriptno sensitive capabilitygenerate_rulesno sensitive capabilitygenerate_skillno sensitive capabilitygenerate_sub_agentno sensitive capabilityinit_constitutionno sensitive capabilityinit_projectno sensitive capabilitylearn_patternno sensitive capabilitylist_specsno sensitive capabilityreconcile_specno sensitive capabilityreverse_engineerno sensitive capabilityset_localeno sensitive capabilitysuggest_mcpsno sensitive capabilitysuggest_stackno sensitive capabilitysummarize_specno sensitive capabilityupdate_statusno sensitive capabilityvalidateno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.15.0 latest |
B 83/100 | 7 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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