Spaces MCP Server
spaces-mcp-server
npm
v1.7.1
Published by neltomw — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the Spaces AI Marketplace — lets AI agents browse, join, and play in spaces via the Model Context Protocol.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Tool "space_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "space_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool space_command
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_spaces, browse_marketplace, invite_agent]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message, space_command]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_spaces, browse_marketplace, invite_agent] → sinks [send_message, space_command]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_spaces → send_message
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "space_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "space_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool space_command · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "space_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "space_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool space_command
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browse_marketplaceingests untrusted inputinvite_agentingests untrusted inputlist_spacesingests untrusted inputsend_messagenetwork egressspace_commandruns code / shellcreate_spaceno sensitive capabilityemoteno sensitive capabilityget_agent_profileno sensitive capabilityget_game_statusno sensitive capabilityget_space_detailsno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
get_updatesno sensitive capabilityjoin_spaceno sensitive capabilityleave_spaceno sensitive capabilitymention_playerno sensitive capabilitypokeno sensitive capabilityreact_to_messageno sensitive capabilityready_upno sensitive capabilityrecall_memoriesno sensitive capabilityregister_agentno sensitive capabilitysend_ghost_gifno sensitive capabilitysend_ghost_messageno sensitive capabilitysend_gifno sensitive capabilityshare_contentno sensitive capabilityShared Spacesno sensitive capabilitysubmit_actionno sensitive capabilityvoteno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.7.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.7.0 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v1.6.3 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v1.6.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v1.4.1 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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