Now Sdk Ext MCP Server
@sonisoft/now-sdk-ext-mcp
npm
v4.8.1
Source verified
Published by sonisoft-cnanda — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for interacting with ServiceNow instances via @sonisoft/now-sdk-ext-core
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Tool "pull_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "pull_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool pull_script
high Tool "push_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "push_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool push_script
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([search_store_apps]) co-exist with external-action tools ([pull_script, push_script]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [search_store_apps] → sinks [pull_script, push_script]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow search_store_apps → pull_script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_name" on "pull_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "pull_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_name" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool pull_script · inputSchema.properties.script_name
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_type" on "pull_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "pull_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_type" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool pull_script · inputSchema.properties.script_type
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_name" on "push_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "push_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_name" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool push_script · inputSchema.properties.script_name
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_type" on "push_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "push_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_type" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool push_script · inputSchema.properties.script_type
low Mutating tool "pull_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "pull_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool pull_script
low Mutating tool "push_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "push_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool push_script
Tools 89
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
pull_scriptruns code / shellpush_scriptruns code / shellsearch_store_appsingests untrusted inputadd_code_search_tableno sensitive capabilityadd_task_commentno sensitive capabilityaggregate_groupedno sensitive capabilityaggregate_queryno sensitive capabilityapprove_changeno sensitive capabilityassign_taskno sensitive capabilitybatch_create_recordsno sensitive capability
Show 79 more tools ↓
batch_update_recordsno sensitive capabilitycancel_flowno sensitive capabilitycheck_instance_healthno sensitive capabilityclone_update_setno sensitive capabilityclose_incidentno sensitive capabilitycode_searchno sensitive capabilitycopy_flowno sensitive capabilitycount_recordsno sensitive capabilitycreate_kb_articleno sensitive capabilitycreate_kb_categoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_update_setno sensitive capabilitycreate_workflowno sensitive capabilitydiscover_table_behaviorno sensitive capabilitydiscover_table_schemano sensitive capabilityexecute_actionno sensitive capabilityexecute_flowno sensitive capabilityexecute_scriptno sensitive capabilityexecute_subflowno sensitive capabilityexplain_fieldno sensitive capabilityexport_record_xmlno sensitive capabilityfind_atf_testsno sensitive capabilityfind_taskno sensitive capabilityget_app_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_attachment_infono sensitive capabilityget_behavior_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_catalog_categoryno sensitive capabilityget_catalog_itemno sensitive capabilityget_cmdb_relationshipsno sensitive capabilityget_current_scopeno sensitive capabilityget_current_update_setno sensitive capabilityget_flow_context_statusno sensitive capabilityget_flow_errorno sensitive capabilityget_flow_execution_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_flow_logsno sensitive capabilityget_flow_outputsno sensitive capabilityget_kb_articleno sensitive capabilityget_knowledge_baseno sensitive capabilityimport_records_xmlno sensitive capabilityinspect_update_setno sensitive capabilityinstall_from_app_repono sensitive capabilityinstall_store_appno sensitive capabilitylist_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_catalog_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_catalog_item_variablesno sensitive capabilitylist_catalog_itemsno sensitive capabilitylist_code_search_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_code_search_tablesno sensitive capabilitylist_company_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_instance_tablesno sensitive capabilitylist_kb_articlesno sensitive capabilitylist_kb_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_knowledge_basesno sensitive capabilitylist_pluginsno sensitive capabilitylist_scoped_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_tool_packagesno sensitive capabilitylist_update_setsno sensitive capabilitylookup_appno sensitive capabilitylookup_columnsno sensitive capabilitylookup_tableno sensitive capabilitymove_update_set_recordsno sensitive capabilitypublish_kb_articleno sensitive capabilitypublish_to_app_repono sensitive capabilityquery_delete_recordsno sensitive capabilityquery_syslogno sensitive capabilityquery_tableno sensitive capabilityquery_update_recordsno sensitive capabilityresolve_incidentno sensitive capabilityrun_atf_testno sensitive capabilityrun_atf_test_suiteno sensitive capabilityset_current_scopeno sensitive capabilityset_current_update_setno sensitive capabilitysubmit_catalog_requestno sensitive capabilitytest_flowno sensitive capabilitytraverse_cmdb_graphno sensitive capabilityupdate_kb_articleno sensitive capabilityupdate_store_appno sensitive capabilityupload_attachmentno sensitive capabilityvalidate_app_installno sensitive capabilityvalidate_catalogno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (89 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.8.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v4.7.1 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v4.7.0 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v4.5.0 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v2.5.1 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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