Solentic MCP Server
@solentic/mcp-server
npm
v1.3.0
Published by @solentic — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Blueprint Agentic Staking — native Solana staking infrastructure for AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Dynamic code execution in server code (.smithery/shttp/module.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`.smithery/shttp/module.js:2941`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .smithery/shttp/module.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "register_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "register_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool register_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_webhooknetwork egressregister_webhooknetwork egresscheck_address_typeno sensitive capabilitycheck_balanceno sensitive capabilitycheck_stake_accountsno sensitive capabilitycheck_withdraw_readyno sensitive capabilitycreate_stake_transactionno sensitive capabilitycreate_unstake_transactionno sensitive capabilitydelete_staking_policyno sensitive capabilitydonateno sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
generate_walletno sensitive capabilityget_epoch_timingno sensitive capabilityget_infrastructureno sensitive capabilityget_performance_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_staking_apyno sensitive capabilityget_staking_policyno sensitive capabilityget_staking_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_validator_infono sensitive capabilityget_verification_linksno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilityset_staking_policyno sensitive capabilitysimulate_stakeno sensitive capabilitystakeno sensitive capabilitysubmit_transactionno sensitive capabilityunstakeno sensitive capabilityverify_code_integrityno sensitive capabilityverify_stake_transactionno sensitive capabilityverify_transactionno sensitive capabilitywithdrawno sensitive capabilitywithdraw_stakeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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