Solana (ExpertVagabond) MCP Server
solana-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.1
Published by expertvagabond — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Solana MCP server for wallet management, transaction handling, and program interactions on Solana blockchain
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-comprehensive.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-comprehensive.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { createInterface } from 'readline'; console.log('🚀 Starting Comprehens
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-comprehensive.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-deployment.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-deployment.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; console.log('🚀 Testing Solana MCP Server Deployment Readiness\n'); // Test th
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-deployment.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-server.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { createInterface } from 'readline'; // Test the Solana MCP server const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-simple.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-simple.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; console.log('🚀 Testing Solana MCP Server - Basic Functionality\n'); const ser
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-simple.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"solana-mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: npm run install-solana
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package solana-mcp-server
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_token_accountsreads sensitive dataget_token_balancereads sensitive dataget_token_supplyreads sensitive dataairdrop_solno sensitive capabilityapprove_delegateno sensitive capabilityburn_tokensno sensitive capabilityclose_token_accountno sensitive capabilitycreate_spl_tokenno sensitive capabilitycreate_token_accountno sensitive capabilitycreate_walletno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
freeze_accountno sensitive capabilityget_account_infono sensitive capabilityget_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_network_infono sensitive capabilityget_recent_blockhashno sensitive capabilityget_transactionno sensitive capabilityimport_walletno sensitive capabilitylist_walletsno sensitive capabilitymint_tokensno sensitive capabilityrevoke_delegateno sensitive capabilityset_token_authorityno sensitive capabilityswitch_networkno sensitive capabilitythaw_accountno sensitive capabilitytransfer_solno sensitive capabilitytransfer_tokensno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan solana-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Solana 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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