Solana Clawd MCP Server
solana-clawd
npm
v1.8.2
Published by x402agent — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
HERMES x402 — Solana-Native Agentic Harness. First private x402 AI agent with OODA loop, pay.sh confidential payments, Google A2A protocol, dark DeFi intelligence, and Nous Research model routing.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([solana_token_info]) and tools that can send data out ([agent_spawn, helius_webhook_create]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [solana_token_info] → sinks [agent_spawn, helius_webhook_create]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow solana_token_info → agent_spawn
high Tool "agent_spawn" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "agent_spawn" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool agent_spawn
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/entrypoints/clawd.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/entrypoints/clawd.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = path.dirnam
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/entrypoints/clawd.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (mcp/dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`mcp/dist/server.js:39`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`https://data.solanatracker.io${path}`, { headers: { Accept: "applicat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/dist/server.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (tui/dist/market.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`tui/dist/market.js:92`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) { const r = await fetch('https://api.coingecko.com/api/v3/simple/price?ids=solana&vs_currencies=usd&include_24hr_c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tui/dist/market.js
low Mutating tool "agent_spawn" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "agent_spawn" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool agent_spawn
Tools 59
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
agent_spawnruns code / shellhelius_webhook_createnetwork egresssolana_token_inforeads sensitive dataagent_listno sensitive capabilityagent_stopno sensitive capabilitychess_current_gamesno sensitive capabilitychess_daily_puzzleno sensitive capabilitychess_leaderboardsno sensitive capabilitychess_playerno sensitive capabilitychess_random_puzzleno sensitive capability
Show 49 more tools ↓
chess_recent_gamesno sensitive capabilitychess_titled_playersno sensitive capabilitydream_runno sensitive capabilitydream_statusno sensitive capabilityhelius_account_infono sensitive capabilityhelius_balanceno sensitive capabilityhelius_das_assetno sensitive capabilityhelius_listener_setupno sensitive capabilityhelius_priority_feeno sensitive capabilityhelius_transactionsno sensitive capabilityhelius_webhook_listno sensitive capabilitymarket_scanno sensitive capabilitymemory_recallno sensitive capabilitymemory_writeno sensitive capabilitymintno sensitive capabilityooda_loopno sensitive capabilityprompt_suggestionsno sensitive capabilitypump_buy_quoteno sensitive capabilitypump_cashback_infono sensitive capabilitypump_graduationno sensitive capabilitypump_market_capno sensitive capabilitypump_new_tokensno sensitive capabilitypump_oodano sensitive capabilitypump_scanno sensitive capabilitypump_sell_quoteno sensitive capabilitypump_token_scanno sensitive capabilitypump_top_tokensno sensitive capabilityREADMEno sensitive capabilitysession_summaryno sensitive capabilityskill_listno sensitive capabilityskill_readno sensitive capabilitySkillsno sensitive capabilitysol_priceno sensitive capabilitysolana_overviewno sensitive capabilitysolana_priceno sensitive capabilitysolana_searchno sensitive capabilitysolana_top_tradersno sensitive capabilitysolana_trendingno sensitive capabilitysolana_wallet_pnlno sensitive capabilitysolana_wallet_tokensno sensitive capabilitySOUL.mdno sensitive capabilitySource fileno sensitive capabilitySource Toolsno sensitive capabilitytokenno sensitive capabilitytrade_researchno sensitive capabilitywalletno sensitive capabilitywallet_analysisno sensitive capabilityx402_payment_historyno sensitive capabilityx402_statusno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (59 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.14.0 | 2026-09-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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