Solana Clawd MCP Server
solana-clawd
npm
v1.8.2
Published by x402agent — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
HERMES x402 — Solana-Native Agentic Harness. First private x402 AI agent with OODA loop, pay.sh confidential payments, Google A2A protocol, dark DeFi intelligence, and Nous Research model routing.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([solana_token_info]) and tools that can send data out ([agent_spawn, helius_webhook_create]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [solana_token_info] → sinks [agent_spawn, helius_webhook_create]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow solana_token_info → agent_spawn
high Tool "agent_spawn" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "agent_spawn" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool agent_spawn
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/entrypoints/clawd.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/entrypoints/clawd.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = path.dirnam
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/entrypoints/clawd.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (mcp/dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`mcp/dist/server.js:39`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`https://data.solanatracker.io${path}`, { headers: { Accept: "applicat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp/dist/server.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (tui/dist/market.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`tui/dist/market.js:92`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) { const r = await fetch('https://api.coingecko.com/api/v3/simple/price?ids=solana&vs_currencies=usd&include_24hr_c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tui/dist/market.js
low Mutating tool "agent_spawn" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "agent_spawn" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool agent_spawn
Tools 59
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
agent_spawnruns code / shellhelius_webhook_createnetwork egresssolana_token_inforeads sensitive dataagent_listno sensitive capabilityagent_stopno sensitive capabilitychess_current_gamesno sensitive capabilitychess_daily_puzzleno sensitive capabilitychess_leaderboardsno sensitive capabilitychess_playerno sensitive capabilitychess_random_puzzleno sensitive capability
Show 49 more tools ↓
chess_recent_gamesno sensitive capabilitychess_titled_playersno sensitive capabilitydream_runno sensitive capabilitydream_statusno sensitive capabilityhelius_account_infono sensitive capabilityhelius_balanceno sensitive capabilityhelius_das_assetno sensitive capabilityhelius_listener_setupno sensitive capabilityhelius_priority_feeno sensitive capabilityhelius_transactionsno sensitive capabilityhelius_webhook_listno sensitive capabilitymarket_scanno sensitive capabilitymemory_recallno sensitive capabilitymemory_writeno sensitive capabilitymintno sensitive capabilityooda_loopno sensitive capabilityprompt_suggestionsno sensitive capabilitypump_buy_quoteno sensitive capabilitypump_cashback_infono sensitive capabilitypump_graduationno sensitive capabilitypump_market_capno sensitive capabilitypump_new_tokensno sensitive capabilitypump_oodano sensitive capabilitypump_scanno sensitive capabilitypump_sell_quoteno sensitive capabilitypump_token_scanno sensitive capabilitypump_top_tokensno sensitive capabilityREADMEno sensitive capabilitysession_summaryno sensitive capabilityskill_listno sensitive capabilityskill_readno sensitive capabilitySkillsno sensitive capabilitysol_priceno sensitive capabilitysolana_overviewno sensitive capabilitysolana_priceno sensitive capabilitysolana_searchno sensitive capabilitysolana_top_tradersno sensitive capabilitysolana_trendingno sensitive capabilitysolana_wallet_pnlno sensitive capabilitysolana_wallet_tokensno sensitive capabilitySOUL.mdno sensitive capabilitySource fileno sensitive capabilitySource Toolsno sensitive capabilitytokenno sensitive capabilitytrade_researchno sensitive capabilitywalletno sensitive capabilitywallet_analysisno sensitive capabilityx402_payment_historyno sensitive capabilityx402_statusno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (59 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan solana-clawd --onlineMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.