Solafon MCP Server
solafon-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by solanafon — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for building bots and interacting with Solana wallet on the Solafon platform
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_token_list, get_token_prices]) and tools that can send data out ([send_message, set_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_token_list, get_token_prices] → sinks [send_message, set_webhook]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_token_list → send_message
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_token_listreads sensitive dataget_token_pricesreads sensitive datasend_messagenetwork egressset_webhooknetwork egressdelete_messageno sensitive capabilityedit_messageno sensitive capabilityget_bot_infono sensitive capabilityget_conversation_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_latest_blockhashno sensitive capabilityget_transaction_historyno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
get_transaction_statusno sensitive capabilityget_userno sensitive capabilityget_wallet_balanceno sensitive capabilitylist_conversationsno sensitive capabilitysend_transactionno sensitive capabilityset_welcome_messageno sensitive capabilitysimulate_transactionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan solafon-mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
Actual Budget MCP server exposing API functionality
MCP server for Actual Budget - query and manage your personal finances through Claude
The Adyen Model Context Protocol server allows you to integrate with Adyen APIs through LLMs function calling utilizing various Clients. It currently supports the following tools:
Trusted agent-commerce hub: discover, trust-check, and route x402 payments with failover.