Socraticode MCP Server
socraticode
npm
v1.13.0
Published by giancarloerra — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
SocratiCode — MCP server for local codebase indexing, semantic search, and code dependency graphs. All private, all local via Docker.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/config.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/code-graph.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/code-graph.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; import fs from "node:fs/promises"; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/code-graph.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/docker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/docker.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { OLLAMA_CONTAINER_NAME, OLLAMA_HO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/docker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/lock.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/lock.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/lock.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/services/lock.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/lock.js:199`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ble option. execSync(`taskkill /F /PID ${pid}`, { stdio: "ignore" }); logger.info("Sent taskkill
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/lock.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/services/gdscript-preflight.cjs)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/gdscript-preflight.cjs:61`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { nativeModule = require(nativePath); } catch (err) { console.error("PREFLIGHT: require() of native addon faile
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/gdscript-preflight.cjs
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
codebase_aboutno sensitive capabilitycodebase_contextno sensitive capabilitycodebase_context_indexno sensitive capabilitycodebase_context_removeno sensitive capabilitycodebase_context_searchno sensitive capabilitycodebase_flowno sensitive capabilitycodebase_graph_buildno sensitive capabilitycodebase_graph_circularno sensitive capabilitycodebase_graph_queryno sensitive capabilitycodebase_graph_removeno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
codebase_graph_statsno sensitive capabilitycodebase_graph_statusno sensitive capabilitycodebase_graph_visualizeno sensitive capabilitycodebase_healthno sensitive capabilitycodebase_impactno sensitive capabilitycodebase_indexno sensitive capabilitycodebase_list_projectsno sensitive capabilitycodebase_removeno sensitive capabilitycodebase_searchno sensitive capabilitycodebase_statusno sensitive capabilitycodebase_stopno sensitive capabilitycodebase_symbolno sensitive capabilitycodebase_symbolsno sensitive capabilitycodebase_updateno sensitive capabilitycodebase_watchno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.13.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.12.0 |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v1.11.0 |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v1.10.0 |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v1.9.2 |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v1.9.1 |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v1.9.0 |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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