Smartbear MCP Server
@smartbear/mcp
npm
v0.40.0
Published by @smartbear — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for interacting SmartBear Products
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/reflect/tool/suites/cancel-suite-execution.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/reflect/tool/suites/cancel-suite-execution.js:21`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://${API_HOSTNAME}/v1/suites/${suiteId}/executions/${executionId}/cancel`,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reflect/tool/suites/cancel-suite-execution.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/reflect/tool/suites/execute-suite.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/reflect/tool/suites/execute-suite.js:16`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://${API_HOSTNAME}/v1/suites/${suiteId}/executions`, { method:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reflect/tool/suites/execute-suite.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/reflect/tool/suites/get-suite-execution-status.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/reflect/tool/suites/get-suite-execution-status.js:21`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://${API_HOSTNAME}/v1/suites/${suiteId}/executions/${executionId}`, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reflect/tool/suites/get-suite-execution-status.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/reflect/tool/suites/list-suite-executions.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/reflect/tool/suites/list-suite-executions.js:16`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://${API_HOSTNAME}/v1/suites/${suiteId}/executions`, { method:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reflect/tool/suites/list-suite-executions.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/reflect/tool/suites/list-suites.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/reflect/tool/suites/list-suites.js:12`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://${API_HOSTNAME}/v1/suites`, { method: "GET", headers: this.client.get
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reflect/tool/suites/list-suites.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/reflect/tool/tests/definition.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/reflect/tool/tests/definition.js:162`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://${API_HOSTNAME}/v1/${endpoint}`, { method: "POST", headers: client.getHea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reflect/tool/tests/definition.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/reflect/tool/tests/get-test-detail.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/reflect/tool/tests/get-test-detail.js:17`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://${API_HOSTNAME}/v1/tests/${encodeURIComponent(testId)}`, { m
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reflect/tool/tests/get-test-detail.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/reflect/tool/tests/get-test-status.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/reflect/tool/tests/get-test-status.js:18`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://${API_HOSTNAME}/v1/executions/${executionId}`, { method: "GE
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reflect/tool/tests/get-test-status.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/reflect/tool/tests/list-tests.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/reflect/tool/tests/list-tests.js:12`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://${API_HOSTNAME}/v1/tests`, { method: "GET", headers: this.client.getH
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reflect/tool/tests/list-tests.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/reflect/tool/tests/run-test.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/reflect/tool/tests/run-test.js:16`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( `https://${API_HOSTNAME}/v1/tests/${testId}/executions`, { method: "P
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reflect/tool/tests/run-test.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.40.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.39.0 |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.38.0 |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.37.0 |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.36.0 |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.35.0 |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.34.0 |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v0.33.0 |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v0.32.0 |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.31.0 |
A 94/100 | 11 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @smartbear/mcp --onlineMore in Analytics & Monitoring
Public-safe MCP admin discovery contract descriptors and response builders.
Pokemon Champions battle advisor MCP server
Airflow MCP server — DAG list, runs, task instances, log tails, trigger and clear over the Airflow REST API
MCP analytics wrapper SDK that instruments MCP tool declarations with telemetry.
AI-ready GIS, geofencing, DataSynch, CRM, inventory, routing, APIs, telemetry and workflows.
AI-native social listening. Monitor buying signals and run GTM workflows via natural language.