Smart Web MCP Server
smart-web-mcp
npm
v0.44.0
Published by jojo-labs — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local MCP for web search, direct-URL fetch, compact normalized output, site crawling, and docs export.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/browser-session.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/browser-session.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { chmodSync, existsSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync } from "node:f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/browser-session.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/smartfetch/adaptive-scraper.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/smartfetch/adaptive-scraper.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm } from "node:fs/promises"; import { tmpdir } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/smartfetch/adaptive-scraper.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/dev-runtime.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/dev-runtime.js:54`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ter || (async (href) => import(href)); let snapshot; return async function load(relativePath) { const fi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/dev-runtime.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/smartfetch/providers/youtube.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/smartfetch/providers/youtube.js:27`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: porter = (specifier) => import(specifier); const defaultYoutubeTranscriptLoader = () => loadYoutubeTranscriptModule(defa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/smartfetch/providers/youtube.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/undetected_chromedriver_fetch.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/undetected_chromedriver_fetch.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: completed = subprocess.run( [command, "--version"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/undetected_chromedriver_fetch.py
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
smartfetchingests untrusted inputsmartcrawlno sensitive capabilitysmartsearchno sensitive capabilitysmartverticalno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.44.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.43.8 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v0.43.7 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.43.6 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v0.43.5 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-02 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v0.43.2 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v0.43.1 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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