Smart Claude Memory MCP Server
smart-claude-memory-mcp
npm
v2.3.2
Published by nabilnet-org — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Sovereign memory protocol for Claude Code — typed, dual-scope, observability-grade. Bring your own empty Supabase project; the plugin handles the rest.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/image.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/image.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { captionImage, embed } from "../ollama.js"; import { upsertChunks, md5 }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/image.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/refactor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/refactor.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { homedir } from "node:os"; import { detectProjectType } from "../project
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/refactor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/sync.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/sync.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { createRequire } from "node:mo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/sync.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tools/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tools/setup.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import net from "node:net"; import { auditBloat, } from "./bloat-audit.js"; cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/setup.js
Tools 58
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_regressionno sensitive capabilityapply_curriculum_taskno sensitive capabilitybatch_freeze_patternsno sensitive capabilitycheck_code_hygieneno sensitive capabilitycheck_rule_conflictsno sensitive capabilitycheck_system_healthno sensitive capabilitycheckpoint_commitno sensitive capabilitycheckpoint_createno sensitive capabilitycheckpoint_listno sensitive capabilitycheckpoint_rollbackno sensitive capability
Show 48 more tools ↓
compact_trajectoryno sensitive capabilitycompose_global_rationaleno sensitive capabilitycompose_skill_candidateno sensitive capabilityconfirm_promotionno sensitive capabilityconfirm_verificationno sensitive capabilitydelegate_taskno sensitive capabilityend_taskno sensitive capabilityfreeze_fileno sensitive capabilityget_daemon_budgetno sensitive capabilityget_task_budgetno sensitive capabilityget_trajectory_summaryno sensitive capabilityindex_imageno sensitive capabilityinit_projectno sensitive capabilitykg_hybrid_searchno sensitive capabilitykg_upsert_edgeno sensitive capabilitykg_upsert_nodeno sensitive capabilitylist_cluster_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_curriculum_tasksno sensitive capabilitylist_frozenno sensitive capabilitylist_global_patternsno sensitive capabilitylist_graduation_candidatesno sensitive capabilitylist_kg_edgesno sensitive capabilitylist_kg_nodesno sensitive capabilitylist_skill_candidatesno sensitive capabilitylist_supernodesno sensitive capabilitymanage_backlogno sensitive capabilitypackage_skillno sensitive capabilitypromote_skill_candidateno sensitive capabilityprune_memoryno sensitive capabilitypull_curriculum_taskno sensitive capabilityraise_verification_gateno sensitive capabilityrefactor_guardno sensitive capabilityreject_curriculum_taskno sensitive capabilityreject_graduationno sensitive capabilityreject_skill_candidateno sensitive capabilityrequest_skillno sensitive capabilityreset_daemon_budgetno sensitive capabilitysave_memoryno sensitive capabilitysearch_memoryno sensitive capabilitystart_taskno sensitive capabilitysummarize_memory_fileno sensitive capabilitysweep_legacy_backupsno sensitive capabilitysync_artefactsno sensitive capabilitysync_local_memoryno sensitive capabilitysystem_dashboardno sensitive capabilitytrigger_clusteringno sensitive capabilityunfreeze_fileno sensitive capabilityupgrade_constitutionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan smart-claude-memory-mcp --onlineMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.