Slurm (Charlie-Z-work) MCP Server
slurm-mcp-server
npm
v2.0.1
Published by charlie-z-work — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for SLURM HPC clusters — 25+ tools, multi-cluster, job templates, auto-reconnect, webhook notifications
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([ssh_read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([ssh_exec, terminal_exec]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [ssh_read_file] → sinks [ssh_exec, terminal_exec]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow ssh_read_file → ssh_exec
high Tool "ssh_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_exec
high Tool "terminal_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "terminal_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool terminal_exec
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.mjs:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e as execFileCb } from 'child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync } from 'fs'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.mjs
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (index.mjs)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`index.mjs:38`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ess.ppid; const raw = execSync(`ps -p ${ppid} -o tty=`, { encoding: 'utf-8' }).trim(); windowTty = (!raw || raw ===
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.mjs
medium Tool "ssh_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "ssh_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool ssh_write_file
low Mutating tool "ssh_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_exec
low Mutating tool "ssh_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_write_file
low Mutating tool "terminal_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "terminal_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool terminal_exec
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ssh_execruns code / shellssh_read_filereads sensitive datassh_write_filewrites filesterminal_execruns code / shellcluster_infono sensitive capabilitycluster_switchno sensitive capabilityguideno sensitive capabilityresource_checkno sensitive capabilityresource_reportno sensitive capabilityslurm_cancelno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
slurm_logsno sensitive capabilityslurm_statusno sensitive capabilityslurm_submitno sensitive capabilityslurm_submit_fileno sensitive capabilityslurm_watchesno sensitive capabilityssh_interactiveno sensitive capabilityssh_statusno sensitive capabilitysync_filesno sensitive capabilitytemplate_listno sensitive capabilitytemplate_saveno sensitive capabilityterminal_readno sensitive capabilityterminal_sendno sensitive capabilityterminal_startno sensitive capabilityterminal_stopno sensitive capabilityworkdir_getno sensitive capabilityworkdir_setno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.1 latest |
B 87/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan slurm-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Slurm 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
SLURM MCP server for HPC cluster management
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