Slashvibe MCP Server
slashvibe-mcp
npm
v0.8.27
Published by vibecodinginc — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Social layer for Claude Code - identity, presence, messaging, and consented live collaboration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (auto-update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`auto-update.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const { promisify } = require('util'); const fs = require('fs').promises; const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server auto-update.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (session-start-hook.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`session-start-hook.cjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eSync } = require('node:child_process'); const { renderIncoming, inertField } = require('./incoming'); const MAX_MESSAG
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server session-start-hook.cjs
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (auto-update.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`auto-update.js:35`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://www.slashvibe.dev/api/version', { headers: { 'User-Agent': 'vibe-mcp-client
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server auto-update.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/verb-canary.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/verb-canary.mjs:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { tmpdir } from 'no
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/verb-canary.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`setup.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } = require('child_process'); const { beginOAuth } = require('./oauth-callback'); const actorSession = requir
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/_work-context.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/_work-context.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); // ═══════════════════
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/_work-context.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/init.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const config = require(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/init.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/reflect.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/reflect.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cFile } = require('node:child_process'); const capabilities = require('../capabilities'); const REFLECT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/reflect.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/start.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/start.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const config = require('../config'); const { apiHeaders } = require('../api-aut
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/start.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/update.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const VIBE_DIR = path.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/update.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.27 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.8.26 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.8.25 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.8.21 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.8.19 |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.8.18 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.8.17 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v0.8.16 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v0.8.14 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v0.8.13 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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