Slack Mpm — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "slack-mpm",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "slack-mpm"
},
"server": {
"name": "slack-mpm"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 91,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 1.2,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (64 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_thread_replies → list_files ⇒ send_message. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_thread_replies → list_files → send_message"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"search_messages",
"list_history",
"get_thread_replies",
"list_list_items"
],
"sources": [
"upload_file",
"list_files"
],
"sinks": [
"send_message",
"upload_file"
],
"path": [
"get_thread_replies",
"list_files",
"send_message"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "get_thread_replies",
"to": "list_files",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "list_files",
"to": "send_message",
"kind": "schema-wired"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"upload_file\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"upload_file\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "upload_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/slack_mpm/cli/main.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/slack_mpm/cli/main.py:112`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/slack_mpm/cli/main.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(module) click.echo(f\" {name}: [{click.style('OK', fg='green')}]\")",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/slack_mpm/cli/main.py",
"line": 112,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded Slack token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_auth.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded Slack token (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `tests/test_auth.py:98`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_auth.py"
},
"evidence": "Slack token: xoxb…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "slack-token",
"file": "tests/test_auth.py",
"line": 98
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_path\" on \"upload_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"upload_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "upload_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filename\" on \"upload_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"upload_file\" takes a path parameter \"filename\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "upload_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filename"
},
"data": {
"param": "filename"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file\" on \"delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"file\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file"
},
"data": {
"param": "file"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"slack-mpm\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "slack-mpm"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"slack-mpm\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "slack-mpm"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"search_messages",
"list_history",
"get_thread_replies",
"list_list_items"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"upload_file",
"list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"send_message",
"upload_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_thread_replies",
"list_files",
"send_message"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: get_thread_replies → list_files ⇒ send_message."
},
{
"id": "flow-2",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"upload_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"upload_file"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"upload_file\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_channels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_channel_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "archive_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "invite_to_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kick_from_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "join_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_channel_topic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "send_ephemeral",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_permalink",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_messages",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_history",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "add_reaction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_reaction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pin_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unpin_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reply_in_thread",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_thread_replies",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_by_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_dm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_user_channels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
],
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "share_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_workspace_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_emojis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_bot_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth_test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_reminders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "complete_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_bookmarks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_bookmark",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_bookmark",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "schedule_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_scheduled_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_scheduled_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_canvas",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_channel_canvas",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_canvas",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_canvas",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_canvas_access",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_canvas_access",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_canvas_sections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_list_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_list_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_list_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_list_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_list_items",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_list_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_list_access",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_list_access",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "markdown_to_canvas",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "markdown_to_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "ae8ceceb628a4656c7752d4b7f6d2af504193385a91a95cd7c279c37ab366521",
"stats": {
"tools": 64,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 1,
"medium": 2,
"low": 5,
"info": 2
}
}
}