Skyramp MCP Server
@skyramp/mcp
npm
v0.3.8
Published by @skyramp — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Skyramp MCP (Model Context Protocol) Server - AI-powered test generation and execution
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/code-refactor/reuse-state.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/code-refactor/reuse-state.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { logger } from "../../utils/logger.js"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/code-refactor/reuse-state.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/localDevWorkerComposeTool.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/localDevWorkerComposeTool.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import yaml from "js-yaml"; import { AnalyticsService } from "../services/Analyt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/localDevWorkerComposeTool.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/queryProxyMocksTool.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/queryProxyMocksTool.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn, execFile } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { MockProtocol } from "../types/TestTyp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/queryProxyMocksTool.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/runExistingTestsTool.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/runExistingTestsTool.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { stripVTControlCharacters } from "util"; import { WorkspaceConfigManager
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/runExistingTestsTool.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/test-management/analyzeChangesTool.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/test-management/analyzeChangesTool.js:1572`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eSync } = await import("child_process"); const remoteUrl = execFileSync("git", ["-C", params.reposit
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/test-management/analyzeChangesTool.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/utils/frontendIntegration.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/utils/frontendIntegration.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import * as fs from "fs"; import * as path from "path"; import { isTestFile, isI
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/utils/frontendIntegration.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/utils/gitStaging.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/utils/gitStaging.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { execFile } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/utils/gitStaging.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/utils/pom-verify/verify.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/utils/pom-verify/verify.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { readFile } from "fs/promises"; import * as path from "path"; import { p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/utils/pom-verify/verify.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/utils/pr-comment-parser.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/utils/pr-comment-parser.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { logger } from "./logger.js"; const TESTBOT_MARKERS = [ "Generated b
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/utils/pr-comment-parser.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/utils/proxy-terminal.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/utils/proxy-terminal.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { spawn, exec } from "child_process"; import path from "path"; import fs from "fs"; import os from "os"; import { prom
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/utils/proxy-terminal.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (build/tools/enrichTestWithMocksTool.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/enrichTestWithMocksTool.js:599`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onst mockModule = await import(service.modulePath);`); lines.push(` const getAllMocks = mockModule.getAll
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/enrichTestWithMocksTool.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.8 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.3.6 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.3.5 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.3.4 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v0.3.3 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v0.3.2 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v0.3.1 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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