Kanban (simonblanco) MCP Server
@simonblanco/kanban-mcp
npm
v1.6.0
Published by @simonblanco — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Kanban board for AI agents coordination with real-time web viewer for human supervision
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/kanban-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/kanban-mcp.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; import { dirname, join } from "path"; cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/kanban-mcp.js
Tools 43
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
kanban_add_conventionno sensitive capabilitykanban_add_dependencyno sensitive capabilitykanban_add_lessonno sensitive capabilitykanban_agent_listno sensitive capabilitykanban_agent_matchno sensitive capabilitykanban_agent_registerno sensitive capabilitykanban_agent_updateno sensitive capabilitykanban_assign_taskno sensitive capabilitykanban_create_taskno sensitive capabilitykanban_delete_taskno sensitive capability
Show 33 more tools ↓
kanban_generate_summaryno sensitive capabilitykanban_get_escalated_tasksno sensitive capabilitykanban_get_issue_sourceno sensitive capabilitykanban_get_learning_insightsno sensitive capabilitykanban_get_statsno sensitive capabilitykanban_get_taskno sensitive capabilitykanban_get_task_contextno sensitive capabilitykanban_get_task_detailno sensitive capabilitykanban_health_checkno sensitive capabilitykanban_import_issuesno sensitive capabilitykanban_initialize_projectno sensitive capabilitykanban_list_tasksno sensitive capabilitykanban_list_unsyncedno sensitive capabilitykanban_log_activityno sensitive capabilitykanban_mark_issue_syncedno sensitive capabilitykanban_move_taskno sensitive capabilitykanban_qa_approveno sensitive capabilitykanban_qa_listno sensitive capabilitykanban_qa_rejectno sensitive capabilitykanban_remove_dependencyno sensitive capabilitykanban_session_endno sensitive capabilitykanban_session_startno sensitive capabilitykanban_set_acceptance_criteriano sensitive capabilitykanban_sprint_bulk_completeno sensitive capabilitykanban_sprint_createno sensitive capabilitykanban_sprint_getno sensitive capabilitykanban_sprint_listno sensitive capabilitykanban_sprint_update_statusno sensitive capabilitykanban_start_iterationno sensitive capabilitykanban_submit_iterationno sensitive capabilitykanban_sync_issueno sensitive capabilitykanban_update_taskno sensitive capabilitykanban_verify_board_healthno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (43 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @simonblanco/kanban-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Kanban 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
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