Simctl (npm) MCP Server
simctl-mcp
npm
v0.0.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
simctl mcp server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Description names a credential store the tool cannot reach ×2 MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 5 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "add_root_certificate" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool add_root_certificate · description
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "add_certificate" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool add_certificate · description
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_envreads sensitive dataadd_certificateno sensitive capabilityadd_mediano sensitive capabilityadd_root_certificateno sensitive capabilityboot_deviceno sensitive capabilitycreate_deviceno sensitive capabilitydelete_deviceno sensitive capabilityget_app_containerno sensitive capabilityget_app_infono sensitive capabilityget_appearanceno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
get_pasteboardno sensitive capabilityget_screenshotno sensitive capabilitygrant_permissionno sensitive capabilityinstall_appno sensitive capabilitylaunch_appno sensitive capabilitylist_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_device_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_runtimesno sensitive capabilityopen_urlno sensitive capabilitypush_notificationno sensitive capabilityreset_keychainno sensitive capabilityreset_permissionno sensitive capabilityrevoke_permissionno sensitive capabilityset_appearanceno sensitive capabilityset_pasteboardno sensitive capabilityshutdown_deviceno sensitive capabilityterminate_appno sensitive capabilityuninstall_appno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.3 latest |
B 86/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan simctl-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Simctl 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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