Signdocs Brasil MCP Server
@signdocs-brasil/mcp-server
npm
v0.11.1
Published by @signdocs-brasil — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for the SignDocs Brasil e-signature API — lets AI agents create signing sessions, manage envelopes, verify documents and more. Local stdio, remote HTTP, and AWS Lambda transports.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_document → get_envelope → delete_webhook. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_document → get_envelope → delete_webhook
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_envelope_combined_stampingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datadelete_webhooknetwork egressdownload_documentingests untrusted inputget_envelopereads sensitive dataregister_webhooknetwork egresstest_webhooknetwork egressadd_session_to_envelopeno sensitive capabilitycancel_envelopeno sensitive capabilitycancel_signing_sessionno sensitive capabilitycancel_transactionno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
create_envelopeno sensitive capabilitycreate_signing_sessionno sensitive capabilityget_evidenceno sensitive capabilityget_my_accountno sensitive capabilityget_signing_sessionno sensitive capabilityget_signing_session_statusno sensitive capabilityget_transactionno sensitive capabilitylist_signing_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_transactionsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilityrequest_document_uploadno sensitive capabilityresend_signing_session_otpno sensitive capabilityupload_documentno sensitive capabilityverify_documentno sensitive capabilityverify_envelopeno sensitive capabilityverify_evidenceno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.11.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.11.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.10.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.9.1 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v0.7.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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