Signallord MCP Server
signallord-mcp-server
npm
v1.1.1
Published by valhallalabs1 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Signal Lord — know which Bitcoin regime you're in and the probabilities of what happens next. Regime detection, AI analysis, and real-time market intelligence.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/signallord-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/signallord-mcp.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require("child_process"); const path = require("path"); const serverPath = path.join(__dirname, "..", "s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/signallord-mcp.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"signallord-mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: pip install -r requirements.txt
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package signallord-mcp-server
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
signallord_ask_odinno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_btc_gold_rationo sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_btc_metricsno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_btc_vix_correlationno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_composite_scoreno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_etf_flow_historyno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_exchange_flow_historyno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_gauge_breakdownno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_gauge_historyno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_institutional_datano sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
signallord_get_liquidation_datano sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_macro_indicatorsno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_odin_analysisno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_odin_track_recordno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_regimeno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_regime_historyno sensitive capabilitysignallord_get_what_changedno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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