Shellward MCP Server
shellward
npm
v0.7.21
Published by jnmetacode — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI agent security & MCP security middleware — prompt injection detection, AI firewall, runtime guardrails & data-loss prevention for LLM tool calls. 8-layer defense against data exfiltration & dangerous commands. Zero dependencies. SDK + OpenClaw plugin.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 33 = 67. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −33 | Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code ×2 MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 67 − 7 = 60. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Grade capped: 2 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 18
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/commands/harden.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/harden.js:36`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ['.ssh/id_rsa', 0o600], ['.ssh/id_ed25519', 0o600], ['.ssh/config', 0o6
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/harden.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-server.js:90`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e. Protects .env, .ssh/, .aws/credentials, private keys, /etc/passwd, etc.', inputSchema: { type: 'o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-server.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/rules/tool-poisoning.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/rules/tool-poisoning.js:60`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pattern: /(?:~\/\.ssh|id_rsa|\.aws\/credentials|\.env\b|\.cursor\/mcp\.json|\.npmrc|\/etc\/passwd|\.config\/.*(?:token
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/rules/tool-poisoning.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/commands/harden.ts)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/commands/harden.ts:45`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 0o600], ['.ssh/id_rsa', 0o600], ['.ssh/id_ed25519', 0o600], ['.ssh/config', 0o600], ['.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/commands/harden.ts
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/mcp-server.ts)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp-server.ts:113`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e. Protects .env, .ssh/, .aws/credentials, private keys, /etc/passwd, etc.', inputSchema: { type: 'object' as
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp-server.ts
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/rules/tool-poisoning.ts)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/rules/tool-poisoning.ts:71`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pattern: /(?:~\/\.ssh|id_rsa|\.aws\/credentials|\.env\b|\.cursor\/mcp\.json|\.npmrc|\/etc\/passwd|\.config\/.*(?:token
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/rules/tool-poisoning.ts
high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (dist/web/scan-server.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded AWS access key id (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `dist/web/scan-server.js:264`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/web/scan-server.js
high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (src/web/scan-server.ts)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded AWS access key id (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `src/web/scan-server.ts:242`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server src/web/scan-server.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auto-check.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auto-check.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync } from 'fs'; import { join } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auto-check.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { ShellWard } from './core/engine.js'; import { runProjectComplianceAudit
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/check-updates.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/check-updates.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'fs'; import { join } from 'path'; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/check-updates.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/harden.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/harden.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { resolveLocale } from '../types.js'; import { getHomeDir } from '../util
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/harden.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/scan-plugins.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/scan-plugins.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ion' }, { pattern: /child_process|execSync|spawnSync|exec\(/, name: 'shell exec', risk: 'command execution' }, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/scan-plugins.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/security.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/security.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { getHomeDir } from '../utils.js'; import { resolveLocale } from '../type
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/security.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/upgrade-openclaw.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/upgrade-openclaw.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { resolveLocale } from '../types.js'; export function registerUpgradeOpen
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/upgrade-openclaw.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-client.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'fs'; import { join } from 'path'; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/web/scan-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/web/scan-server.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, existsSync, statSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/web/scan-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/auto-check.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/auto-check.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process' import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync } from 'fs' import { join } from '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/auto-check.ts
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.21 latest |
D 60/100 | 18 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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