Vibescout — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@sevenseconds/vibescout",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@sevenseconds/vibescout"
},
"server": {
"name": "@sevenseconds/vibescout"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/vibescout.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/vibescout.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/vibescout.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"url\"; import { dirname, resolve } from \"path\"; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/vibescout.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/core.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/core.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/core.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; const execAsync = promisify(exec); export con",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/core.js",
"line": 26,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/git-info.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/git-info.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/git-info.ts"
},
"evidence": "import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import path from 'path'; import { logger } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/git-info.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.js:378`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.js"
},
"evidence": "cSync } = await import(\"child_process\"); const pluginName = name.startsWith(\"vibescout-plugin-\") ? name : `vibesco",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/index.js",
"line": 378,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/server.js:916`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/server.js"
},
"evidence": "exec } = await import(\"child_process\"); const { promisify } = await import(\"util\"); const execAsync = promisify(exe",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/server.js",
"line": 916,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/providers/CloudflareProvider.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/providers/CloudflareProvider.ts:61`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/providers/CloudflareProvider.ts"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch( `https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/${this.accountId}/ai/run/${model}`",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/providers/CloudflareProvider.ts",
"line": 61,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/providers/GeminiProvider.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/providers/GeminiProvider.ts:62`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/providers/GeminiProvider.ts"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch( `https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/${model}:embedContent?ke",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/providers/GeminiProvider.ts",
"line": 62,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/index.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.js:385`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const output = execSync(`${cmd} install ${globalFlag} ${pluginName}`, { encoding: \"utf-8\" }); console.l",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "src/index.js",
"line": 385,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.js:697`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.js"
},
"evidence": "st pluginModule = await import(absolutePath); const plugin = pluginModule.default; if (!plugin) {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/index.js",
"line": 697,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/plugins/loader.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/plugins/loader.ts:40`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/plugins/loader.ts"
},
"evidence": "json'); const pkg = require(packagePath); return pkg.version || '0.0.0'; } catch { return '0.0.0'; } }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/plugins/loader.ts",
"line": 40,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/ui-dist/assets/index-D-QMV8nm.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/ui-dist/assets/index-D-QMV8nm.js:11`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/ui-dist/assets/index-D-QMV8nm.js"
},
"evidence": "n[e.id];try{let r=await import(e.module);return n[e.id]=r,r}catch(r){return console.error(`Error loading route module \\`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/ui-dist/assets/index-D-QMV8nm.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_file\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "index_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_indexing_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "move_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_dependencies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_symbol_usages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_knowledge_base",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "watch_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_code_range",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_current_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "126dcad881cfa11a7df781ad9c4361027ae37d4f4dac6830935f09e90a33c5bf",
"stats": {
"tools": 13,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 6,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}