Seungmanchoi App Publisher MCP Server

@seungmanchoi/app-publisher-mcp npm v1.8.0

Published by @seungmanchoi — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for vibe coders - AI app icon generation, auto-resizing for iOS/Android, and store publishing automation

Trust grade
B
86/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
B · 86/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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B Why this grade threat 93 − adoption risk = 86/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−6.3 Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 injection
−1.2 Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 supply-chain

2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 7 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 4

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/fastlane.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/services/fastlane.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; export class FastlaneSer

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/services/fastlane.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/maestro.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/services/maestro.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as os from 'os'

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/services/maestro.js

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/services/maestro.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`dist/services/maestro.js:14`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: try { execSync(`"${this.getMaestroBin()}" --version`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); return true;

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/services/maestro.js

low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010

"@seungmanchoi/app-publisher-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.

Evidence: echo '\n[app-publisher-mcp] Run `npm run setup:maestro` to install Maestro CLI for UI testing (requires Java 17+)\n'

Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.

Location: package @seungmanchoi/app-publisher-mcp

Tools 39

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • admob_authno sensitive capability
  • admob_create_ad_unitno sensitive capability
  • admob_create_appno sensitive capability
  • admob_integrateno sensitive capability
  • admob_list_ad_unitsno sensitive capability
  • admob_list_appsno sensitive capability
  • admob_statusno sensitive capability
  • configure_admobno sensitive capability
  • configure_api_keyno sensitive capability
  • configure_modelno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
  • configure_playstoreno sensitive capability
  • generate_iconno sensitive capability
  • generate_screenshotno sensitive capability
  • generate_splashno sensitive capability
  • generate_store_listingno sensitive capability
  • get_publishing_guideno sensitive capability
  • get_statusno sensitive capability
  • maestro_run_flowno sensitive capability
  • maestro_run_yamlno sensitive capability
  • maestro_screenshotno sensitive capability
  • maestro_statusno sensitive capability
  • maestro_store_screenshotno sensitive capability
  • playstore_delete_imagesno sensitive capability
  • playstore_get_app_infono sensitive capability
  • playstore_get_listingno sensitive capability
  • playstore_get_tracksno sensitive capability
  • playstore_list_imagesno sensitive capability
  • playstore_setup_keyno sensitive capability
  • playstore_statusno sensitive capability
  • playstore_update_listingno sensitive capability
  • playstore_upload_imageno sensitive capability
  • playstore_verify_accessno sensitive capability
  • populate_metadatano sensitive capability
  • publish_androidno sensitive capability
  • publish_iosno sensitive capability
  • resize_iconsno sensitive capability
  • setup_fastlaneno sensitive capability
  • setup_maestrono sensitive capability
  • validate_metadatano sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.8.0 latest B 86/100 4 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: B · 86/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @seungmanchoi/app-publisher-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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