@seungmanchoi/app-publisher-mcp
npm
v1.8.0
Published by @seungmanchoi — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for vibe coders - AI app icon generation, auto-resizing for iOS/Android, and store publishing automation
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 7 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/fastlane.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; export class FastlaneSer
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/fastlane.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/maestro.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as os from 'os'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/maestro.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/maestro.js:14`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`"${this.getMaestroBin()}" --version`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); return true;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/maestro.js
"@seungmanchoi/app-publisher-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: echo '\n[app-publisher-mcp] Run `npm run setup:maestro` to install Maestro CLI for UI testing (requires Java 17+)\n'
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @seungmanchoi/app-publisher-mcp
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
admob_authno sensitive capabilityadmob_create_ad_unitno sensitive capabilityadmob_create_appno sensitive capabilityadmob_integrateno sensitive capabilityadmob_list_ad_unitsno sensitive capabilityadmob_list_appsno sensitive capabilityadmob_statusno sensitive capabilityconfigure_admobno sensitive capabilityconfigure_api_keyno sensitive capabilityconfigure_modelno sensitive capabilityconfigure_playstoreno sensitive capabilitygenerate_iconno sensitive capabilitygenerate_screenshotno sensitive capabilitygenerate_splashno sensitive capabilitygenerate_store_listingno sensitive capabilityget_publishing_guideno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilitymaestro_run_flowno sensitive capabilitymaestro_run_yamlno sensitive capabilitymaestro_screenshotno sensitive capabilitymaestro_statusno sensitive capabilitymaestro_store_screenshotno sensitive capabilityplaystore_delete_imagesno sensitive capabilityplaystore_get_app_infono sensitive capabilityplaystore_get_listingno sensitive capabilityplaystore_get_tracksno sensitive capabilityplaystore_list_imagesno sensitive capabilityplaystore_setup_keyno sensitive capabilityplaystore_statusno sensitive capabilityplaystore_update_listingno sensitive capabilityplaystore_upload_imageno sensitive capabilityplaystore_verify_accessno sensitive capabilitypopulate_metadatano sensitive capabilitypublish_androidno sensitive capabilitypublish_iosno sensitive capabilityresize_iconsno sensitive capabilitysetup_fastlaneno sensitive capabilitysetup_maestrono sensitive capabilityvalidate_metadatano sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.0 latest |
B 86/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @seungmanchoi/app-publisher-mcp --online
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