Session Mgmt — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "session-mgmt-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "session-mgmt-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "session-mgmt-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (session_mgmt_mcp/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/cli.py:167`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "] process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL if not verbose else Non",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/cli.py",
"line": 167,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (session_mgmt_mcp/crackerjack_integration.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/crackerjack_integration.py:177`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/crackerjack_integration.py"
},
"evidence": "ss result = subprocess.run( cmd, check=False, capture_output",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/crackerjack_integration.py",
"line": 177,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (session_mgmt_mcp/server_core.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/server_core.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/server_core.py"
},
"evidence": "ilable result = subprocess.run( [\"crackerjack\", \"--version\"], check=False, c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/server_core.py",
"line": 63,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (session_mgmt_mcp/server_optimized.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/server_optimized.py:371`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/server_optimized.py"
},
"evidence": "icator result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"log\", \"--oneline\", \"-20\", \"--since='24 hours ago'\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/server_optimized.py",
"line": 371,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (session_mgmt_mcp/tools/agent_analyzer.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/tools/agent_analyzer.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/tools/agent_analyzer.py"
},
"evidence": "ern\": r\"hardcoded.*path|shell=True|unsafe\", \"agent\": AgentType.SECURITY, \"confidence\": 0.85,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/tools/agent_analyzer.py",
"line": 63,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (session_mgmt_mcp/tools/crackerjack_tools.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/tools/crackerjack_tools.py:1330`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/tools/crackerjack_tools.py"
},
"evidence": "true\" result = subprocess.run( [\"python\", \"-m\", \"crackerjack\", \"--version\"], check=Fals",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/tools/crackerjack_tools.py",
"line": 1330,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (session_mgmt_mcp/tools/session_tools.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/tools/session_tools.py:363`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/tools/session_tools.py"
},
"evidence": "sync_result = subprocess.run( [\"uv\", \"sync\"], check=False, cwd",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/tools/session_tools.py",
"line": 363,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (session_mgmt_mcp/utils/file_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/utils/file_utils.py:159`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/utils/file_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "ommand result = subprocess.run( [\"uv\", \"cache\", \"clean\"], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/utils/file_utils.py",
"line": 159,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (session_mgmt_mcp/utils/git_operations.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/utils/git_operations.py:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/utils/git_operations.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"--show-toplevel\"], capture_output=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/utils/git_operations.py",
"line": 50,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (session_mgmt_mcp/utils/git_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/utils/git_utils.py:106`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/utils/git_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "fails.\"\"\" result = subprocess.run( command, cwd=current_dir, capture_output=True, t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/utils/git_utils.py",
"line": 106,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (session_mgmt_mcp/health_checks.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/health_checks.py:287`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/health_checks.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(module_name) except ImportError: missing_imports.append(m",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/health_checks.py",
"line": 287,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (session_mgmt_mcp/llm_providers.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`session_mgmt_mcp/llm_providers.py:92`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "session_mgmt_mcp/llm_providers.py"
},
"evidence": "\"anthropic\": __import__( \"session_mgmt_mcp.llm.providers.anthropic_provider\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "session_mgmt_mcp/llm_providers.py",
"line": 92,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "search_reflections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_welcome",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "permissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auto_compact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "quality_monitor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_llm_providers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_llm_providers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_with_llm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chat_with_llm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "configure_llm_provider",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "checkpoint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "end",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "health_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "server_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_team",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_team_knowledge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_team_statistics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vote_on_reflection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "608c58bb9bb151e6c333d731b38ef9979feff40a44df8997f4ba1a1fa806a73c",
"stats": {
"tools": 21,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}