Sensorium MCP Server
sensorium-mcp
npm
v3.1.5
Published by andriyshevchenko — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for remote control of AI assistants via Telegram
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/dashboard/routes/snapshots.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard/routes/snapshots.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { readBody, safeParseJSON } from "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/dashboard/routes/snapshots.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const { dataPath } = await import("./lib/paths.js"); const binary = dat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/integrations/openai/video.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/integrations/openai/video.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; import { mkdirSync, readdirSync, statS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/integrations/openai/video.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/self-update.service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/self-update.service.js:54`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/self-update.service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/spawn-common.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/spawn-common.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { closeSync, existsSync, fstatSync, openSync, readSync, unlinkSync, write
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/spawn-common.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/integrations/openai/chat.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/integrations/openai/chat.js:31`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions", { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/integrations/openai/chat.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/integrations/openai/speech.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/integrations/openai/speech.js:25`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: response = await fetch("https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/speech", { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/integrations/openai/speech.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/integrations/openai/vision.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/integrations/openai/vision.js:39`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions", { method: "POST", he
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/integrations/openai/vision.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/services/self-update.service.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/self-update.service.js:344`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/sensorium-mcp/${encodeURIComponent(channel)}`, { signal: Abort
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/self-update.service.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.1.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v3.1.4 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-17 |
v3.1.3 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v3.1.2 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v3.1.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v3.0.103 |
B 87/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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